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NOTES 
Extended Voluntary Departure: Limiting the Attorney 
General's Discretion in Immigration Matters 
Fifteen times in the past quarter-century, the Attorney General 
has decreed that aliens of certain nationalities could temporarily re-
main in the United States regardless of their visa status. 1 Government 
officials have characterized these grants of blanket extended voluntary 
departure (EVD)2 as a means of protecting aliens from life-threatening 
conditions in their homelands. 3 The Attorney General's actions were 
apparently undertaken for humanitarian reasons4 and went largely un-
1. Government figures vary on this point. According to H.R. REP. No. 1142, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess., pt.I, at 54 (1984), blanket extended voluntary departure (EVD) has been granted to nation-
als from Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Czechoslovakia, Chile, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, Leb· 
anon, Ethiopia, Uganda, Iran, Nicaragua, Afghanistan, and Poland. The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) excludes the Dominican Republic from the list, but adds Hungary 
and Rumania. Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Asylum Adjudica-
tions: An Evolving Concept and Responsibility for the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
67-68 (June and Dec. 1982) (mimeo) [hereinafter INS, Asylum Adjudications] (copy on file at 
Michigan Law Review). See note 40 infra. Gordon and Rosenfield state that extended voluntary 
departure was also granted to Yugoslavians, but they provide no documentation for this inclu-
sion. IA c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 5.3e(6a) 
(1981). 
2. Case-by-case extensions of voluntary departure, see notes 25-32 infra and accompanying 
text, under 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) (1986), see note 24 infra, are sometimes referred to as "ex-
tended voluntary departure." See, e.g., Bolanos v. Kiley, 509 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1975); 
United States ex rel Bartsch v. Watkins, 175 F.2d 245, 247 (2d Cir. 1949); Akbari v. Godshall, 
524 F. Supp. 635, 644 (D. Colo. 1981); 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 7.2a. 
En masse grants of indefinite voluntary departure are also referred to as "extended voluntary 
departure." See, e.g., Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 
502, 505 (D.D.C. 1984), affd. in part, revd. in part, 804 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1986); lA C. 
GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 5.3e(6a); INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note I, 
at 65. This Note uses EVD to refer only to this latter type of relief. 
3. See note 152 infra. The INS describes EVD status as follows: 
Nationals from many countries visit, study, or do business in the United States regularly. 
From time to time unexpected crises - war, political upheaval, etc. - occur in the home 
country which could jeopardize the lives of visitors in the United States if they returned 
during the crises. In such situations, acting on specific State Department recommendation, 
the Attorney General has permitted foreign nationals in the United States to remain until 
conditions in their home country stabilize. Usually the State Department cites civil war, 
invasion by foreign nationals, etc., as precipitating factors in its recommendations to the 
Justice Department. The Attorney General then authorizes extended voluntary departure 
status for a specified period for nationals of the requisite country. 
The status is a temporary one, granted for varying periods, reviewed and then extended 
or terminated at the end of that time. The action is a blanket determination, that is, all 
nationals of a particular country who are in the United States are covered. 
INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note 1, at 65. 
4. See note 152 infra and accompanying text; see also 1A C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 
supra note 1, § 5.3e(6a) (describing EVD as "temporary sanctuary"). But see note 153 infra 
(government has asserted that EVD is granted for other reasons). 
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noticed by the public. s 
Recently, however, the Attorney General denied EVD status to 
Salvadoran nationals, 6 despite the perilous conditions faced by those 
forced to return to El Salvador. 7 This denial has sparked controversy 
in the press8 and one court case - Hotel & Restaurant Employees 
Union, Local 25 v. Smith. 9 For the first time, the source and nature of 
5. This lack of public notice is exemplified by the dearth of published material on the subject. 
See generally T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POLICY 726-43 
(1985) (presentation of general EVD concept and study of proposed use of EVD for Salvadoran 
aliens); lA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note l, § 5.3e(6a) (one-page summary ofEVD 
concept in an eight-volume treatise on immigration law); A. LEIBOWITZ, IMMIGRATION LAW 
AND REFUGEE POLICY§ 5.05, at 5-156 to 5-160 (1983) (one page synopsis with reproductions of 
two news articles on specific instances where EVD was granted); Note, Salvadoran Illegal Aliens: 
A Struggle to Obtain Refuge in the United States, 47 U. PITT. L. REv. 295, 309-33 (1985) (histor-
ical look at the issue and discussion of the potential for extending EVD to Salvadorans). The 
denial of EVD status to Salvadorans did cause a flurry of articles in the press. See note 8 infra. 
6. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 563 F. Supp. 157, 159 
(D.D.C. 1983), motion for summary judgment granted, 594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 1984) ("Plain-
tiff seeks to challenge ... the failure of the Attorney General and the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) to grant [Salvadorans] extended voluntary departure."); Letter from 
William F. Smith, Attorney General, to Representative Lawrence J. Smith (July 19, 1983), re-
printed in Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment at Exhibit D, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 563 
F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1983) (No. 82-2203) [hereinafter Defendants' Memorandum] ("I have 
concluded that the present circumstances do not warrant a granting of 'extended voluntary de-
parture' to El Salvadorans presently in the United States illegally."). 
7. The Department of State's 1984 Country Report on El Salvador states: 
Human rights conditions in El Salvador are strongly affected by the ongoing civil strife. The 
achievement of a stable public order sufficient to protect individual rights has been disrupted 
by guerrilla and military operations, partisan hatreds, acts of revenge, fear, and a prevailing 
uncertainty characterized by violence. This situation contributes to, and is complicated by, 
the ineffective operation of the judicial system, caused in part by corruption and 
intimidation. 
DEPT. OF STATE, 99TH CONG., lsr SESS., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES 
FOR 1984, at 512-13 (Joint Comm. Print 1985). Authorities agree that over 40,000 noncomba-
tants have been killed in El Salvador over the last five years. See, e.g., Extended Voluntary 
Departure Issues: Hearings on§ 377 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration Refugee Policy of the 
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 111 (1985); Temporary Suspension of De-
portation of Certain Aliens, 1984: Hearing on H.R. 4447 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, 
Refugees, and International Law, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 29-30 (1984) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 
4447]. See generally Note, The Agony and the Exodus: Deporting Salvadorans in Violation of the 
Fourth Geneva Convention, 18 N.Y.U. J. INTL. L. & POLITICS 703, 719-25 (1986) (description of 
human rights abuses in El Salvador). Reports suggest that Salvadorans forced to return to El 
Salvador from the United States face even greater dangers than those who never left the country. 
ACLU, NATIONAL IMMIGRATION AND ALIEN RIGHTS PROJECT, SALVADORANS IN THE 
UNITED STATES: THE CASE FOR ExTENDED VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE, appendix III (Rpt No. 
1, Dec. 1983). 
8. See, e.g., Shelter for Refugees, L.A. Times, Apr. 29, 1985, at 4, col. l; Insensitivity on 
Refugees, L.A. Times, Feb. 25, 1985, § 2, at 4, col. l; Salvadorans Rebuffed on Special Immigra-
tion Status, Wash. Post, Sept. 27, 1984, at A9, col. l; It's Wrong to Deport Salvadorans Right 
Now, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1983, at A20, col. 4; Abrams, Diluting Compassion, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 5, 1983, at A23, col. l; Restaurant Union Challenges Federal Immigration Policy, Wash. 
Post, June 16, 1983, at Al, col. l; Why Poles but Not Salvadorans?, N.Y. Times, May 31, 1983, at 
A20, col. l; U.S. is Condemned Over Salvadorans, N.Y. Times, May 21, 1983, at AS, col. l; 
Deporting Salvadorans, Wash. Post, Apr. 2, 1983, at Al4, col. l; Salvadorans Forced Back into 
''Hell," N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1983, at A26, col. 5. 
9. 563 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1983), motion for summary judgment granted, 594 F. Supp. 502 
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EVD status are being examined and questioned. Unfortunately for 
Salvadorans and similarly situated aliens, the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia granted summary judgment for the 
defendants in Employees Union, finding that EVD is "a matter of the 
Attorney General's absolute discretion on issues of foreign and 
prosecutorial policy" IO and thus not subject to judicial review beyond 
an initial examination into whether the Attorney General's decision 
had a rational basis. I I In so holding, the Employees Union court rati-
fied the extrastatutory nature of this status and recognized broad, 
nearly unbridled discretion in the Attorney General. 
In refusing to review the Attorney General's decision, the Employ-
ees Union court followed the traditional restrictive view of judicial in-
volvement in immigration law, which assumes that immigration 
matters are entitled to substantial judicial deference.I2 This view, 
which has dominated our legal tradition for the past century, is now 
being challenged by a new vision of immigration law marked by 
heightened judicial scrutiny and a recognition of the rights accruing to 
aliens simply because of their intrinsic human worth. I3 This Note ar-
gues that, because of the important interests at stake, EVD is more 
properly examined under this incipient legal tradition. 
Part I of this Note defines EVD and distinguishes it from related 
forms of deportation relief. Part II describes the Employees Union 
court's holding. The evolution of American perceptions of immigra-
tion law is laid out in Part III and the concept of "communitarianism" 
is explored. Part IV investigates the source of EVD and concludes 
that EVD arises not from the discretionary enforcement of the immi-
gration laws, but from the voluntary departure provisions of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act of 1952 (INA).I4 Thus, Part V finds 
that EVD determinations should be subject to narrow judicial review 
for abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA)15 and urges that a "reasons requirement" be imposed on the 
Attorney General. Part VI concludes by integrating EVD into the 
communitarian model. 
(D.D.C. 1984), ajfd. in part, revd. in part, 804 F.2d 1256 (D.C. Cir. 1986). The court noted that 
"the issue presented ... , that of judicial review of the Attorney General's determination regard· 
ing a grant ofEVD, is one offirst impression in the Courts." 594 F. Supp. at 505. [As this Note 
was going to press, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit affirmed the district 
court's grant of summary judgement to the defendants on the EVD issue in the Employees Union 
case. See Author's Postscript, notes 204-09 infra and accompanying text.-Ed.] 
10. 594 F. Supp. at 504. 
11. 594 F. Supp. at 508. 
12. See notes 91-96 infra and accompanying text. 
13. See notes 97-105 infra and accompanying text. 
14. 8 u.s.c. §§ 1101-1503 (1982). 
15. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (1982 & Supp. II 
1984). 
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I. VOLUNTARY DEPARTURE, EXTENSIONS OF VOLUNTARY 
DEPARTURE, AND EVD DEFINED AND DISTINGUISHED 
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The concept of EVD is not well-understood.16 A major cause of 
the confusion surrounding this relief is the terminology used; even the 
INS staff apparently has difficulty distinguishing voluntary departure, 
extensions of voluntary departure, and extended voluntary departure 
from each other.17 Although these forms of deportation relief are con-
ceptually related, they have different objectives and effects. 
The INA gives the Attorney General discretionary authority to 
grant voluntary departure status to deportable aliens. 18 The Act per-
mits the Attorney General to grant this status both to aliens already 
involved in deportation proceedings19 and to aliens for whom deporta-
tion hearings have not yet been held. 20 An alien who voluntarily de-
parts the United States avoids several discommodious legal 
consequences21 and, unlike a deported alien, need not obtain special 
permission to reapply for admission within the next year.22 Aliens 
granted this status who do not fall into one of the special categories 
16. Over one-half of the 40 INS staff members interviewed for an INS report stated that they 
had never heard of EVD. Not a single field officer was able to name the countries to which EVD 
then applied. INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note l, at 66. 
17. See INS Wire of Feb. 6, 1984, reprinted in 61 INTERPRETER RELEASES 103 (1984) (inter-
nal memorandum distinguishing "extensions" of voluntary departure from EVD). Several com-
mentators have urged the renaming of EVD as a solution to the confusion. See notes 197-98 
infra and accompanying text. 
18. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982), quoted in note 20 infra, and 8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982), 
quoted in note 19 infra. Voluntary departure originally evolved through the ad hoc practices of 
administrative officers. The Alien Registration Act codified the practice in 1940. 2 C. GORDON 
& H. ROSENFIELD, supra note l, § 7.2a. 
19. With exceptions not relevant here, 
[t]he Attorney General may, in his discretion, permit any alien under deportation proceedings 
... to depart voluntarily from the United States at his own expense in lieu of deportation if 
such alien shall establish to the satisfaction of the Attorney General that he is, and has been, 
a person of good moral character for at least five years immediately preceding his applica-
tion for voluntary departure under this subsection. 
8 U.S.C. § 1254(e) (1982) (emphasis added). 
20. In the discretion of the Attorney General, and under such regulations as he may pre-
scribe, deportation proceedings ... need not be required in the case of any alien who admits 
to belonging to a class of aliens who are deportable under section 1251 of this title if such 
alien voluntarily departs from the United States at his own expense, or is removed at Govern-
ment expense as hereinafter authorized .... 
8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1982) (emphasis added). 
21. Unlike deportation, voluntary departure (1) "avoids the stigma of compulsory ejection;" 
(2) "facilitates the possibility of return to the United States;" (3) "often entails the certainty of 
speedy return;" and (4) "enables the applicant to select his own destination." 2 C. GORDON & 
H. ROSENFIELD, supra note l, § 7.2a, at pp. 7-18 to 7-19; see also Tzantarmas v. United States, 
402 F.2d 163, 165 n.l (9th Cir. 1968) (discussing benefits of voluntary departure), cert. denied, 
394 U.S. 966 (1969); Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory Relief, 14 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 229, 253-54 (1976) (same). 
22. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(l6) (1982) provides that aliens who have been deported are excluded 
from admission into the United States for one year unless the Attorney General consents to their 
application for readmission. 
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discussed below23 (which allow for "extensions") must leave the 
United States within thirty days unless "meritorious circumstances" 
are present. 24 
INS regulations permit the granting of extensions of voluntary de-
parture status to certain aliens.25 For example, an alien who meets the 
other statutory requirements and "in whose case the district director 
has determined there are compelling factors warranting grant of vol-
untary departure"26 may be granted an extension of voluntary depar-
ture. 27 Other classes of aliens who may receive extensions of 
voluntary departure status include aliens who have been granted asy-
lum but who have not been granted parole or stay of deportation,28 
certain nonimmigrant aliens who have lost such status solely because 
of private bills introduced on their behalf, 29 and certain aliens admissi-
ble to the United States who meet other conditions as well.30 The INS 
officer must generally grant the status in specific increments of time31 
and his or her decision is not subject to administrative appeal.32 
23. See text at notes 25-32 infra. 
24. With exceptions not relevant here, "any grant of voluntary departure shall contain a time 
limitation of usually not more than 30 days, and an extension of the original voluntary departure 
time shall not be authorized except under meritorious circumstances." 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) 
(1986). 
25. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) (1986). 
26. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2)(viii) (1986). 
27. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) (1986); see also note 147 infra and accompanying text (describing 
provisions of INS Operations Instructions on extensions of voluntary departure). 
28. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2)(vii) (1986). 
29. 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2)(v) (1986). 
30. Voluntary departure may be granted to any alien who is statutorily eligible: ••• (vi) 
who is admissible to the United States as an immigrant and: (A) Who is an immediate 
relative of a U.S. citizen, or (B) is otherwise exempt from the numerical limitation on immi-
grant visa issuance, or (C) has a priority date for an immigrant visa not more than 60 days 
later than the date show [sic] in the latest Visa Office Bulletin and has applied for an immi-
grant visa at an American Consulate which has accepted jurisdiction over the case, or 
(D) who is a third-preference alien with a priority date earlier than August 9, 1978, or 
(E) who is the beneficiary of an approved sixth-preference petition who satisfies Examina-
tions without another petition that he/she can qualify for third preference and who cannot 
obtain a visa solely because a visa number is unavailable, and who has a priority date earlier 
than August 9, 1978 .... 
8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2) (1986). Other classes of aliens who are eligible for voluntary departure 
include aliens who are natives of contiguous territories who are not within the class described 
above, 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2)(i) (1986), any alien whose application for extension for stay as a 
nonimmigrant is being denied, 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2)(ii) (1986), aliens who have voluntarily sur-
rendered to the INS, 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2){iii) (1986), and aliens with valid travel documents 
and confirmed reservations to leave the United States within 30 days, 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2)(iv) 
(1986). 
31. The status usually may be granted in increments of one year. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(3) 
(1986). However, certain categories of aliens who are admissible as immigrants may receive the 
status in increments of 30 days, while other categories of aliens may receive an indefinite grant of 
that status. Id. 
32. "An appeal shall not lie from a denial of an application of voluntary departure under this 
section, but the denial shall be without prejudice to the alien's right to apply for relief from 
deportation under any provision of law." 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(b) (1986). 
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No statute or regulation explicitly sanctions the granting of "blan-
ket" extended voluntary departure (EVD) to all nationals of a specific 
country. Rather, the privilege has evolved through INS practice since 
1960, when the INS conferred EVD status upon Cubans.33 EVD dif-
fers from extensions of voluntary departure in two significant respects: 
(1) EVD is granted to aliens who are temporarily unable to return to 
their home country because of dangerous conditions there34 and 
(2) the determination does not usually involve individual evaluations, 
but rather applies to all nationals of the country involved who are 
within the United States.35 Grants of EVD status permit the United 
States to extend temporary aid to aliens without requiring it to grant 
them permanent status. 36 EVD grants also conserve the Attorney 
33. See note 40 infra. 
34. See lA c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 5.3e(6a), at pp. 5-47 to 5-48; INS, 
Asylum Adjudications, supra note 1, at 65. But see note 153 infra (Attorney General has re-
cently asserted that foreign policy considerations control EVD determinations); note 43 infra 
(EVD granted to Silva letterholders for domestic policy reasons). 
35. See INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note 1, at 65 ("The action is a blanket determina-
tion, that is, all nationals of a particular country who are in the United States are covered."); lA 
c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note I, § 5.3e(6a), at pp. 5-47 to 5-48; A. LEIBOWITZ, 
supra note 5, § 5.05, at p. 5-156. · 
EVD is not always granted on a "blanket" basis, however. On occasion it has been granted 
on a "case-by-case" basis. For example, INS instructions regarding Lebanese nationals stated: 
In view of the continuing civil strife in Lebanon, INS officers, on a case-by-case basis, 
should view sympathetically requests for extended voluntary departure received from na-
tionals of Lebanon in the United States who have overstayed, where such requests are based 
upon compelling humanitarian need. There is no blanket policy to grant extended voluntary 
departure in these cases. 
INS Policy Statement No. 016 (Feb. 12, 1976), reprinted in INS Declines EVD for Lebanese but 
Re-Issues 1976 Policy Memo, 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 899 (1985). The INS Commissioner 
stated that case-by-case EVD grants were more appropriate in this instance "because of the 
highly adverse immigration effects of a blanket grant of extended voluntary departure, and the 
availability of other remedies for nationals of Lebanon." Letter from Alan C. Nelson, INS Com-
missioner, to James Abourezk (Aug. 13, 1985), reprinted in 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 920 
(1985). 
36. Through grants of EVD, 
[t]he United States is able to meet its international treaty obligations regarding potential 
refugees and provide a "safe haven" while at the same time not granting permanent resi-
dency to large groups of aliens outside of regular immigration channels or forcing foreign 
nationals to renounce their homeland in order to avoid what may be a relatively short-lived 
crisis. 
A. LEIBOWITZ, supra note 5, § 5.05, at p. 5-157; see also INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note 
I, at 66. Aliens granted EVD status are still eligible to apply for other types of deportation relief. 
See INS Wire of Feb. 6, 1984, supra note 17, at 104 ("While the Attorney General's determina-
tions to grant 'EVD' are binding as to enforcement actions involving individuals of the specified 
nationality, both favorable and unfavorable determinations on EVD leave unchanged the availa-
bility of discretionary relief for individual aliens under the Act and regulations."). The INS has a 
standard letter which informs aliens who have been denied asylum, but who are of a nationality 
covered by EVD, of their eligibility for that status. See 62 INTERPRETER RELEASES 256 (1985) 
(reprint of letter). INS officers believe that asylum applications from nationals who have been 
afforded EVD should not be processed while the aliens retain that status. One officer stated: "A 
few people might have problems, ... but overall it would save us a whole lot of trouble. Right 
now it's almost impossible to adjudicate these claims. If you turn them down, you can't deport 
them. They only file again, saying conditions in the home country have changed." INS, Asylum 
Adjudications, supra note 1, at 70. State Department personnel disagree, however. "It would be 
158 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:152 
General's enforcement resources since an individual response to each 
dislocated alien is no longer required. 37 The aliens benefit by being 
allowed to stay in the United States until conditions in their home 
country improve38 even though they may not have met the more strin-
gent requirements for refugee status.39 
EVD status has been granted to nationals from fifteen countries 
and today still applies to nationals from five countries.40 The Attor-
a bigger pull factor. Adjudicating the claims, even though you can't send anyone back, is a big 
deterrent." Id. 
37. See Plaintiffs' Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
Issue of Extended Voluntary Departure at 32, Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. 
Smith, 563 F. Supp. 163 (D.D.C. 1983) (No. 82-2203) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Opposition]. 
38. See also note 134 infra (work authorization and other benefits available to aliens granted 
EVD status). 
39. "Refugee" is defined as a person who is either outside his or her country of nationality or 
habitual residency, or, under special circumstances, within that country, and who suffers from 
"persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, mem· 
bership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (1982). The 
procedure by which asylum may be granted to an alien found to be a refugee within the meaning 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (1982) is outlined in 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1982). In addition, the Refu-
gee Act of 1980 further provides that: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return any 
alien •.. to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would 
be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particu-
lar social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(l) (1982). For a general discussion of 
U.S. law regarding refugees, see T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 5, at ch. 8; Martin, 
The Refugee Act of 1980: Its Past and Future, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 90; Note, 
Membership in a Social Group: Salvadoran Refugees and the 1980 Refugee Act, 8 HASTINGS 
INTL. & COMP. L. REV. 305 (1985). 
40. As stated in note 1 supra, government statistics vary. The chart below reflects the infor-
mation submitted by the United States as Exhibit E attached to Defendants' Memorandum, 
supra note 6. The information in parentheses indicates areas in which INS, Asylum Adjudica-
tions, supra note l, at 67-68, differs significantly from the Government's data. 
COUNTRY DATE EVD DATE EVD NOTES 
Cuba 
Dominican Republic* 
"Western Hemi-
sphere"* 
"Western Hemisphere" 
Czechoslovakia 
Chile 
Cambodia 
Vietnam 
Laos 
GRANTED TERMINATED 
11/29/60 11/02/66 
10/18/66 04/26/78 
07/01/68 
08/82 
08/21/68 
04/09/71 
04/04/75 
04/04/75 
07/09/75 
12/31/76 
01/31/83 
12/30/77 
12/30/77 
(05/18/71) 
10/28/77 
10/28/77 
10/28/77 
See Pub. L. No. 89-732. 
For aliens arriving between 
04/24/65 and 06/03/66. 
Granted to certain individ· 
uals with visa preference 
dates from 
07/01/68 to 12/31/76 in 
response to an order 
entered in Silva v. Levi, 
Civ. Action No. 76-C-4268 
(N.D. Ill.).•• 
"Second grant." 
(From 1977-1981, EVD 
granted in one-year incre· 
ments. Extensions now 
determined on case-by-case 
basis.) 
See Pub. L. No. 95-145. 
See Pub. L. No. 95-145. 
See Pub. L. No. 95-145. 
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ney General's procedure for granting this status is simple. Upon re-
ceiving a State Department recommendation,41 the Attorney General 
(Lebanon) (02112176) (Still in effect) (INS views requests "sym-
pathetically" on a case-by-
case basis.) [See Legislative 
Relief For Salvadorans and 
Nicaraguans Receives 
Renewed Consideration, 63 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 
626, 627 [hereinafter Legis-
lative Relief] (EVD still in 
effect as of 07 /28/86).] 
Ethiopia 07/12177 Still in effect. [See Legislative Relief, 
supra (EVD still in effect 
as of07/28/86).] 
(Hungary) (12/30/77) (04/81) (From 12/30177 to 04/81, 
EVD granted in one-year 
increments. Since 04/29/ 
81, extensions decided on 
case-by-case basis.) 
(Rumania) (12/30177) (04/81) (From 12/30177, to 04/81, 
EVD granted in one-year 
increments. Since 04/29/ 
81, extensions decided on 
case-by-case basis.) 
Uganda 06/08178 Still in effect. [Scheduled to expire 09/ 
30/86; see INS Wire of 
July 31, 1986, reprinted in 
63 INTERPRETER 
RELEASES 649 (1986).] 
Iran 04/16/79 12/13179 (Case-by-case determina-
Renewed: tions still in effect today.) 
08/06179 
Nicaragua 07/03179 09/28/80 (Case-by-case determina-
Renewed: tions in effect today.) 
08/29179 
01/04/80 
07/01/80 
Mexico 12/31/79 08/25/81 Granted for certain second 
preference visa holders in 
response to an order 
entered in Contreras v. 
Bell, Civ. Action No. 80-
1590 (N.D. Ill.). 
Afghanistan 12/02/80 Still in effect. [See INS Wire of Dec. 2, 
1980, reprinted in 62 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 
106 (1985) (current policy 
on Afghans); Legislative 
Relief, supra (EVD still in 
effect as of 07 /28/86).] 
Poland 12/23/81 Still in effect. [Scheduled to expire 12/ 
Renewed: 30/86; see INS Wire of 
03/25/82 June 18, 1986, reprinted in 
06/21/82 63 INTERPRETER 
12/20/82 RELEASES 539 (1986)] 
06/30/83 
• These countries were not included on the INS list . 
•• See note 43 infra. 
41. The INS states that the Attorney General acts "on a specific State Department recom-
160 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 8S:1S2 
authorizes EVD status for a specific period of time for all aliens af-
fected. The Attorney General usually conveys his decision by a direc-
tive either (1) instructing INS officials to consider "sympathetically" 
requests for discretionary relief by the affected aliens42 or (2) in-
structing INS officials not to begin deportation proceedings against 
those aliens or, if an alien has already received a deportation order, not 
to enforce departure. 43 
II. HOTEL & RESTAURANT EMPLOYEES UNION, LOCAL 25 V. SMITH 
Despite the lack of explicit authority for his actions, 44 the Attor-
ney General granted EVD status to various groups of aliens over a 
mendation," INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note 1, at 65, and that "[t]he Attorney General 
has always accepted the State Department's recommendation, even though it might be only a 
brief paragraph or two." Id. at 70-71. 
Government officials accept the role of the State Department in these determinations as 
proper, even though Congress has neither mandated nor sanctioned the practice. See, e.g., Letter 
from Senator Edward Kennedy to Alexander Haig, Secretary of State (Apr. 6, 1981), reprinted in 
128 CoNG. REc. 1702 (1982) ("Clearly, the Immigration Service must await a formal recommen-
dation from the Department of State prior to initiating a policy of automatically granting stays of 
voluntary departure."); Letter from William F. Smith, Attorney General, to Representative Law-
rence J. Smith (July 19, 1983), reprinted in Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 6, at Exhibit 
D (''There have been occasions when the Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of 
State, has determined to delay temporarily expulsion of aliens [of] particular nationalities."). 
42. See, e.g., INS Wire of Dec. 12, 1978, reprinted in SS INTERPRETER RELEASES 8S (1978) 
("The civil strife in [Lebanon] continues and this is to reaffirm that officers should, on a case by 
case basis, view sympathetically requests for extended voluntary departure where such requests 
are based on compelling humanitarian need."). 
43. See, e.g., INS Wire of Jan. 21, 1982, reprinted in S9 INTERPRETER RELEASES SS (1982) 
(emphasis in original): 
Service action shall not be taken to enforce departure to Poland, prior to March 31, 1982, of 
Polish nationals who are residents or former residents of Poland and who indicate an unwill-
ingness to return to Poland at the present time under the unstable conditions currently ex-
isting there. Extensions of temporary stay may be granted to those non-immigrants who 
qualify for such extensions. If an application is denied, the Polish national's departure shall 
not be enforced prior to March 31, 1982. Polish nationals who are located as deportable 
aliens will be permitted to remain until March 31, 1982. Deportation hearings will be post-
poned until after March 31, 1982, for those Polish nationals for whom OSC's [orders to 
show cause] have been issued and hearings have not commenced. Those hearings for Polish 
nationals which have commenced shall go forward; however, departure shall not be en-
forced prior to March 31, 1982. In those cases where a final order of deportation has been 
entered, departure shall not be enforced prior to March 31, 1982. 
See also INS Wire of July 12, 1982, reprinted in S9 INTERPRETER RELEASES 4S6 (1982) (INS 
instructions on EVD for Ethiopians). 
The Attorney General did deviate from his usual practice when, after the Senate passed an 
immigration bill, he granted EVD to Silva Jetterholders (most of whom were Mexican nationals) 
in anticipation of the House passing a similar bill legalizing their presence in the United States. 
As INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note 1, at 68 n.*, notes: 
This action was unique in that it was the first time blanket extended voluntary departure 
was granted primarily for domestic policy considerations rather than a crisis in the foreign 
national's homeland; it was also the first time the Attorney General acted unilaterally with-
out a specific recommendation from the Department of State. 
See generally Staff Report, The Silva Case, in U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL 
INTEREST, STAFF REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POL· 
ICY, app. D at 71 (1981) [hereinafter SCIRP]. 
44. See Part IV infra. 
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twenty-three-year period beginning in 1960.45 His actions went un-
challenged in the courts46 until 1983, when Hotel & Restaurant Em-
ployees Union, Local 25 v. Smith 41 was filed. The case was initiated by 
a union whose membership consisted primarily of Salvadoran nation-
als. 48 The impetus for the suit was the adamant refusal of the Attor-
ney General to grant EVD status to Salvadoran nationals despite 
urgings by Congress49 and the public50 to do so. 51 The plaintiff 
45. See notes 1 & 40 supra and accompanying text. 
46. See note 9 supra. 
47. 563 F. Supp. 157 (D.D.C. 1983). 
48. 594 F. Supp. at 504. 
49. In May, 1981, the Justice Department responded to a request from Senator Edward Ken-
nedy that it grant EVD status to Salvadoran nationals by stating that it had "received word from 
the Department of State that it [was] not in a position to recommend a blanket granting of 
voluntary departure for illegal Salvadorans presently in the United States." Letter from David 
Crosland, Acting Commissioner of INS, to Senator Edward M. Kennedy (May 1, 1981), re-
printed in 128 CoNG. R.Ec. 1703 (1982). Congress then included a provision in the International 
Security and Development Cooperation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-113, § 731, 95 Stat. 1557 (1981), 
which stated: 
It is the sense of the Congress that the administration should continue to review, on a 
case-by-case basis, petitions for extended voluntary departure made by citizens of El Salva-
dor who claim that they are subject to persecution in their homeland, and should take full 
account of the civil strife in El Salvador in making decisions on such petitions. 
A similar request from 89 members of the House of Representatives in April 1983 was also 
rejected by the Attorney General and the Secretary of State. See letters reprinted in Hearing on 
H.R. 4447, supra note 7, at 84-88. Again, Congress responded with a "sense of the Congress" 
resolution. Department of State Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1984 and 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-
164, § 1012, 97 Stat. 1062 (1983), provided: 
(a) The Congress finds that -
(1) ongoing fighting between the military forces of the Government of El Salvador and 
opposition forces is creating potentially life-threatening situations for innocent nationals of 
El Salvador; 
(2) thousands of El Salvadoran nationals have fled from El Salvador and entered the 
United States since January 1980; 
(3) currently the United States Government is detaining these nationals of El Salvador 
for the purpose of deporting or otherwise returning them to El Salvador, thereby irreparably 
harming the foreign policy image of the United States; 
(4) deportation of these nationals could be temporarily suspended, until it became safe 
to return to El Salvador, if they are provided with extended voluntary departure status; and 
(5) such extended voluntary departure status has been granted in recent history in 
cases of nationals who fled from Vietnam, Laos, Iran, and Nicaragua. 
(b) Therefore, it is the sense of the Congress that -
(1) the Secretary of State should recommend that extended voluntary departure status 
be granted to aliens -
(A) who are nationals of El Salvador, 
(B) who have been in the United States since before January 1, 1983, 
(C) who otherwise qualify for voluntary departure (in lieu of deportation) under sec-
tion 242(b) or 244(e) of the [INA] (8 U.S.C. 1252(b) and 1254(e)), and 
(D) who were not excludable from the United States at the time of their entry on any 
ground specified in section 212(a) of the [INA] (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)) other than the grounds 
described in paragraphs (14), (15), (20), (21), and (25); and 
(2) such status should be granted to those aliens until the situation in El Salvador has 
changed sufficiently to permit their safely residing in that country. 
Another "sense of the Congress" provision crept into title IV of the Simpson-Mazzoli Bill, H.R. 
1510, 98th- Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1983) (passed by the House, June 20, 1984): 
It is the sense of Congress that in the case of nationals of El Salvador who otherwise qualify 
for voluntary departure (in lieu of deportation) under the Immigration and Nationality Act, 
the Attorney General shall extend the date such aliens are required to depart voluntarily 
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claimed that "the denial by the INS of extended voluntary departure 
to Salvadorans [was] arbitrary and capricious, violative of the Fifth 
Amendment, and contrary to the rule-making procedures of 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553."S2 The defendants filed motions to dismiss, arguing that (1) the 
plaintiff lacked standing to sue, (2) the decision to grant or deny EVD 
was nonjusticiable as a political question, and (3) the complaint did 
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.s3 The court re-
jected each of these motions and ordered the case to proceed either to 
motions for summary judgment or to trial. s4 
The defendants prevailed on their subsequent motion for summary 
judgment. ss In its second Employees Union opinion, the court charac-
until such date as the Secretary of State determines that the situation in El Salvador has 
changed sufficiently to permit their safely returning to El Salvador. 
Bills requiring the Attorney General to grant EVD status to Salvadoran nationals were intro-
duced in both houses during the second session of the 98th Congress, see S. 2131, 98th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1984); H.R. 447, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984), and the first session of the 99th Congress, see 
S. 377, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 822, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985). 
50. See note 8 supra. 
51. Relatively few Salvadorans receive any kind of immigration relief in the United States. 
Approximately 4000 Salvadorans enter the United States illegally each month, one-quarter of 
whom are apprehended by the INS. s. STEPHEN, EDUCATION AND PUBLIC WELFARE DIV!· 
SION, CONGRESSIONAL REsEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, U.S. POLICY TOWARDS 
UNDOCUMENTED SALVADORANS 1 (MB82223) (May 6, 1986); UNITED NATIONS HIGH COM· 
MISSIONER FOR REFUGEES MISSION TO MONITOR INS AsYLUM PROCESSING OF SALVADORAN 
ILLEGAL ENTRANTS, Sept. 13-18, 1981 [hereinafter UNHCR REPORT], reprinted in 128 CONG. 
REc. 1698, 1699 (1982) (only one of every four illegal Salvadorans is apprehended). There are an 
estimated 300,000 to 500,000 Salvadorans currently residing illegally in the United States. H.R. 
REP. No. 1142, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. I, at 2 (1984). The great majority of those caught by the 
INS depart voluntarily from the United States. UNHCR REPORT, supra, at 1701 (90% of all 
apprehended Salvadorans return "voluntarily" to El Salvador). Very few Salvadorans are 
granted asylum relief. Only one Salvadoran received asylum in Fiscal Year 1981, id. at 1698, 
prompting the UNHCR to conclude that the United States was violating its responsibilities 
under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 
6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267. See UNHCR REPORT, supra, at 1698. The 
Salvadorans have fared somewhat better in recent years. In Fiscal Year 1983, 163 requests by 
Salvadoran nationals for asylum relief were granted and 6576 were denied. In Fiscal Year 1984, 
328 were granted and 13,045 were denied. See S. STEPHEN, supra, at 2. Nonetheless, only 2.28% 
of asylum requests by Salvadoran nationals were granted in Fiscal Year 1984 as compared to an 
average of 30% for all other nationalities. See Note, supra note 39, at 330; see also Note, supra 
note 7, at 705 & nn. 11, 12 (statistics on asylum applications). A number of suits were brought 
on behalf of Salvadorans denied refugee status, alleging various discriminatory practices and 
procedural improprieties by the government. For a discussion of these cases, see Note, supra 
note 5, at 304-09. 
52. 563 F. Supp. at 162. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, It 
also alleged that the State Department routinely denied asylum applications of Salvadorans with· 
out regard to the merit of the individual claims, in violation of "the Fifth Amendment to the 
Constitution, the United Nations Convention and Protocol on the Status of Refugees, 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1158, and Department of State Notice 351." 563 F. Supp. at 161. 
53. 563 F. Supp. at 159. 
54. 563 F. Supp. at 163. 
55. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Smith, 594 F. Supp. 502 (D.D.C. 
1984). The defendants filed two motions for summary judgment: one pertaining to the EVD 
claim and the other pertaining to the asylum procedures claim. Both were granted. 
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terized EVD as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion56 and found 
that it was not subject to judicial review under the provisions of the 
APA.57 Therefore, in the court's view, the plaintiff had no grounds for 
claiming relief. 
As the first judicial pronouncement on EVD, Employees Union is 
an important indication of how this status is viewed in the judiciary. 
The court interpreted grants of EVD as responses to foreign and do-
mestic policy considerations, 58 rather than as manifestations of hu-
manitarian concern for the safety and well-being of the aliens involved. 
The court found both constitutional59 and statutory60 bases for the 
Attorney General's power to grant EVD, despite the clear extra-
statutory nature of EVD status. 6t 
The court began by stating that "[t]he Constitutional foundation 
56. The court stated that EVD is "a matter of the Attorney General's prosecutorial discre-
tion, after his review of the evidence, to suspend, or . . . not to suspend enforcement of the 
immigration laws in a specific case." 594 F. Supp. at 507. The court followed the parties' leads 
in classifying EVD in this manner. The defendants had characterized EVD as "an extraordinary 
form of relief arising not from the various rights and remedies specifically provided by the [Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952], but from the Executive's discretionary authority in the 
formulation and implementation of prosecutorial and foreign policy." Defendants' Memoran-
dum, supra note 6, at 2. They asserted that "[t]he 'benefit' enjoyed by members of an alien class 
for which [EVD] has been granted is the ability, through deferred prosecution of the deportation 
provisions, to extend their stay in the United States." Id. at 26. Hence, they argued, the author-
ity to grant EVD lies in "the Executive's broad constitutional authority [to exercise] 
prosecutorial discretion as to the proper enforcement of federal law." Id. at 19 n.13. The plaintiff 
acquiesced in the defendants' description of EVD as an exercise in prosecutorial discretion, stat-
ing that the issue presented was "the reviewability of an agency's enforcement discretion." Plain-
tiffs' Opposition, supra note 37, at 13; see also T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 5, at 
727 (EVD "is essentially an exercise ofprosecutorial discretion"). This Note argues that EVD is 
not properly viewed as an exercise of prosecutorial discretion. See Part IV.A infra. 
57. See notes 71-76 infra and accompanying text. The court did review the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision to determine if it was "rationally based" in accordance with the rule laid out in 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 794-96 (1977). The court found that the Attorney General's decision 
was rationally based upon "foreign policy considerations" as well as several other factors, 
including: 
(i) the number of illegal Salvadoran aliens currently in the United States, (ii) the current 
crisis in generally controlling the "ftoodtide" of illegal immigration, (iii) the prospect of 
encouraging further illegal immigration, (iv) the effect of such illegal immigration upon this 
country's limited law enforcement capabilities, social services and economic resources, and 
(v) the availability under the Immigration and Nationality Act of alternate avenues of relief, 
such as asylum. 
594 F. Supp. at 508. 
58. 594 F. Supp. at 505. The court stated that EVD 
is a term not found anywhere in the Immigration and Nationality Act or in the applicable 
regulations. Rather, the term Extended Voluntary Departure describes the Attorney Gen-
eral's discretion in determining the circumstances of both foreign and domestic policy which 
may give rise to a discretionary decision to grant a temporary suspension of deportation 
proceedings to members of a particular class of illegal aliens. As such, EVD is based on the 
prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General after consultation or advice received from 
the State Department. 
594 F. Supp. at 505. 
59. See note 65 infra and accompanying text. 
60. See note 68 infra and accompanying text. 
61. See note 70 infra and accompanying text. 
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for grants of EVD derives from the Executive's express and inherent 
authority in the areas of both foreign and prosecutorial policy."62 The 
court noted that the "regulation of aliens" was " 'intricately interwo-
ven' " with the plenary power over foreign affairs constitutionally 
vested in the Executive branch. 63 Moreover, regulation over immigra-
tion is "an 'inherent executive power.' "64 Thus, in the court's eyes, 
the Attorney General was constitutionally authorized to execute for-
eign policy by granting this status to aliens. 
The court then noted that under the Constitution, discretionary 
matters, including those in the immigration area, are governed by "the 
plenary, if not exclusive authority" of the executive branch. 65 The de-
cision to deport (or not to deport) is a matter of "prosecutorial discre-
tion"66 and, as the Supreme Court has noted, the constitutional 
authority to exercise such discretion reaches its zenith in the area of 
immigration law. 67 
Finally, the Employees Union court found a statutory basis for 
grants of EVD in the INA, which authorizes the Attorney General to 
"establish such regulations . . . and perform such other acts as he 
deems necessary for carrying out [the administration and enforcement 
of the Act]."68 Since, in the court's view, grants of EVD were "'ra-
tionally related' "69 to the duties imposed upon the Attorney General 
by the Act, his exercise of discretion in this area was valid, even 
though EVD is neither statutorily condoned or mandated. 70 
62. 594 F. Supp. at 505. 
63. 594 F. Supp. at 505 (quoting Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 588-89 (1952)). 
Article II, § 2 of the Constitution places responsibility for the conduct of foreign affairs in the 
executive branch. 
64. 594 F. Supp. at 505 (quoting United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 
542 (1950)). 
65. 594 F. Supp. at 505 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)). 
66. 594 F. Supp. at 505 (citing Johns v. Department of Justice, 653 F.2d 884, 893 (5th Cir. 
1981); Weisburg v. Department of Justice, 489 F.2d 1195, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 
416 U.S. 993 (1974)). 
67. 594 F. Supp. at 505 (citing Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 596-97 (1952); 
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 164 (1948)). Since EVD status merely postpones application 
of the deportation provisions of the INA, the court found EVD to be no more than "an exercise 
of the Executives [sic] 'pure enforcement power.'" 594 F. Supp. at 505 (quoting Attorney Gen. 
v. Irish People, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 948 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983)). 
68. 594 F. Supp. at 505-06 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § l 103(a) (1982)). 
69. 594 F. Supp. at 506 (quoting Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728, 730 (2d Cir. 1970)). 
The federal courts have used this reasonable relationship test in the immigration law area to 
uphold the Attorney General's discretionary decisions to impose differing reporting requirements 
on nonimmigrant alien students on the basis of nationality, Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 
(D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980), to extend the stay of a nonimmigrant alien, 
Unification Church v. Attorney Gen., 581 F.2d 870, 877-78 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 
828 (1978), to restrict employment of nonimmigrant alien students, see Ahmed v. United States, 
480 F.2d 531, 533-34 (2d Cir. 1973); Pilapil v. INS, 424 F.2d 6, 11 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 
U.S. 908 (1970), and to deny aliens admitted without a visa eligibility to apply for permanent 
resident status, Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728, 730 (2d Cir. 1970). 
70. The court stated that "the fact that EVD is extrastatutory in no way effects [sic] its 
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Having located the source of the Attorney General's power to 
grant EVD status, the court went on to state that two provisions of the 
AP A prevented judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to 
deny this relief to Salvadoran nationals.71 First, the APA subjects to 
review only "[a]gency action made reviewable by statute a final agency 
action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court .... "72 
Since EVD is not made reviewable by statute and since aliens denied 
this status retain the full panoply of procedures and appeals available 
in deportation proceedings, the Employees Union court found that the 
APA precluded judicial review.73 
Second, the AP A also prohibits judicial review of agency action 
"committed to agency discretion by law."74 This provision applies 
where " 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case 
there is no law to apply.' "75 The court found that, because of EVD's 
extrastatutory nature, there was "indeed 'no law to apply.' "76 
The court thus concluded that EVD was simply not the type of 
agency action in which courts should interfere. 77 It emphasized that 
because EVD involves prosecutorial discretion, which is necessarily 
broad, 78 and because immigration is intertwined with the conduct of 
foreign affairs, an area in which the courts are loath to intervene,79 the 
Attorney General's decision could be subject to no more than limited 
review for abuse of discretion. 80 The court went on to find that even 
validity as a discretionary action under the Act." 594 F. Supp. at 506. Further, the court noted, 
"[t]his Circuit has held that the Act 'need not specifically authorize each and every action taken 
by the Attorney General, so long as his action is reasonably related to the duties imposed on 
him.'" 594 F. Supp. at 506 (quoting Narenji v. Civiletti, 617 F.2d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 1979), 
cerl denied, 446 U.S. 957 (1980)). 
71. 594 F. Supp. at 506. 
72. 5 u.s.c. § 704 (1982). 
73. 594 F. Supp. at 506. 
74. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). 
75. 594 F. Supp. at 506 (quoting S. REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). 
76. 594 F. Supp. at 507. The court noted that: 
The factors involved in determining the propriety of judicial review of an agency's ex~r­
cise of discretion are the breadth of the discretionary power, the administrative expertise as 
balanced against judicial competence to evaluate the action at issue, whether there exists 
meaningful criteria by which a court may evaluate the action, and whether the decision is 
one based on policies to which a court must defer to the political branches. 
594 F. Supp. at 507 (citations omitted). 
77. 594 F. Supp. at 507. 
78. 594 F. Supp. at 507. 
79. "[M]atters relating 'to the conduct of foreign relations ... are so exclusively entrusted to 
the political branches of government as to be largely immune from judicial inquiry or interfer-
ence.' " Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984) (citation omitted), quoted in Employees Union, 
594 F. Supp. at 507; see also notes 62 & 63 supra and accompanying text. 
80. This Court cannot claim to have the expertise needed to decide such issues of foreign 
policy, and will defer to the Executive, to whom this area has been Constitutionally en-
trusted. Only in the case of a clear abuse of discretion may a Court impose its judgment 
over that of the Executive in a case such as the one at bar. 
594 F. Supp. at 507 (citations omitted). 
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this narrow review was unavailable, noting that a court can review for 
abuse of discretion only where a standard exists by which to gauge the 
executive's action. 81 The Employees Union court found that no such 
standard exists for EVD, rejecting plaintiff's argument that a "human-
itarian" standard had evolved as a result of the pattern of past EVD 
grants by the Attorney General. 82 Therefore, the court found that the 
Attorney General's decision not to grant EVD status to Salvadoran 
nationals was not subject to judicial review. 83 
The Employees Union court's analysis of the scope of judicial re-
view available to EVD claims is consistent with the teachings of the 
past century of immigration law. 84 As the next Part discusses, how-
ever, immigration law is undergoing a gradual transformation. Deter-
mination of the scope of judicial review available in cases such as 
Employees Union depends at least in part upon how the American 
legal system views the status of aliens. In dismissing EVD as an unre-
viewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion, the Employees Union 
court embraced the traditional conception of immigration law, which 
emphasizes the limited rights of aliens and affords extreme judicial 
deference to the legislative and executive branches in immigration 
matters. 85 This view is ultimately unsatisfying because it ignores both 
the substantive nature of EVD and the impact of the Attorney Gen-
eral's decision on aliens such as the Salvadorans. The nascent concept 
of "communitarianism,"86 on the other hand, suggests a more sensi-
tive way of analyzing the competing interests involved in EVD claims. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF IMMIGRATION LAW 
Immigration law has long occupied a unique place in American 
jurisprudence. Despite the transformations wrought by increased judi-
81. 594 F. Supp. at 507. 
82. 594 F. Supp. at 508. The court stated that not only did the standard not exist, but that 
the standard would be too difficult to define and enforce if it did: 
For a Court to order EVD in this case would set a far-reaching precedent, wholly within the 
perogatives [sic] of Congress, and might then apply to all situations of widespread fighting, 
destruction and the breakdown of public services and order throughout the world. Also, 
such situations as famine, drought, or other natural disasters might at any time also raise 
"humanitarian" concerns, wherever they might occur. To require the Attorney General to 
grant blanket EVD status to all such nationals would be to open up irresponsibly the flood-
gates to illegal aliens, without regard to foreign policy and internal immigration concerns, 
or, oi' equal importance, to the concerns of American working men and women in the 
United States and our taxpayers generally. 
594 F. Supp. at 508. 
83. 594 F. Supp. at 508. The court also found that the Salvadorans had not been denied due 
process as a result of the Attorney General's refusal to grant them EVD status, 594 F. Supp. at 
508-09, and that summary judgment was appropriate since plaintiff failed to refute defendants' 
statement of material facts. 594 F. Supp. at 509-10. 
84. See Part III.A infra. 
85. See notes 91-96 infra and accompanying text. 
86. See notes 97-105 infra and accompanying text. 
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cial activism and the expansion of constitutional protections in other 
areas of law in recent decades, immigration law has remained surpris-
ingly untouched. 87 The "insularity" of immigration law has, however, 
come under increasing attack by legal scholars. 88 As a result, immi-
gration law is slowly changing as perceptions of aliens and their rela-
tionship to American society change. This evolution has important 
implications for the nature of EVD and the procedural safeguards due 
it. 
A. The Development of American Immigration Policy 
The evolution of American immigration policy is closely tied to the 
changing social, economic, and political milieus of the country. Pro-
fessor Schuck has identified three stages in the development of Ameri-
can immigration policy.89 From the beginning of the Republic to the 
1880s, a "liberal ideology," which recognized the "moral worth and 
dignity" of the individual and his right to a role in society, resulted in 
an immigration policy that actively recruited mass immigration.90 
As the United States ceased being a land of endless frontiers and 
87. Immigration has long been a maverick, a wild card, in our public law. Probably no 
other area of American law has been so radically insulated and divergent from those funda-
mental norms of constitutional right, administrative procedure, and judicial role that ani-
mate the rest of our legal system. In a legal firmament transformed by revolutions in due 
process and equal protection doctrine and by a new conception of judicial role, immigration 
law remains the realm in which government authority is at the zenith, and individual entitle-
ment is at the nadir. 
Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law, 84 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 1 (1984); see also 
Verkuil, A Study of Immigration Procedures, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1141, 1144 (1984) ("[u]ntil 
recently law has been the handmaiden of immigration policy"). 
88. See, e.g., Legomsky, Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Congressional Powet:, 
1984 SUP. Cr. REv. 255, 255 (Supreme Court should cease affording special deference to Con-
gress in immigration matters); Ludd, The Essentiality of Judicial Review: Toward a More Bal-
anced Understanding of Administrative Discretion in American Government, in ADMINISTRATIVE 
DISCRETION AND PUBLIC POLICY IMPLEMENTATION 14 (1986) [hereinafter Ludd, Balanced 
Understanding]; Ludd, Administrative Discretion and the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice: To Review or Not to Review?. 8 THURGOOD MARSHALL L. REV. 65, 65 (1983); Schuck, 
supra note 87, at 3 n.12 (citing scholars who have attacked the current privileged position of 
immigration law); Verkuil, supra note 87, at 1144. 
89. Schuck, supra note 87, at 2-4. 
90. Id. at 2. Schuck states: 
The liberalism of America's first century conceived of persons as autonomous, self-defining 
individuals possessing equal moral worth and dignity and equally entitled to society's con-
sideration and respect. This entitlement was in principle universally shared, a natural right 
deriving not from the particularities of one's time, place, or status, but from one's irreduci-
ble humanity. 
Id.; see also Developments in the Law - Immigration Policy and the Rights of Aliens, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1286, 1292-93 (1983) [hereinafter Developments] ("The liberal view is that the fulfillment 
of the individual comes not in participating in the public life of the State, but in choosing and 
pursuing her own goals in private life.") (footnotes omitted). 
Schuck perhaps paints too rosy a picture of early immigration policy. As a government study 
noted, a certain measure of xenophobia existed in the United States from its first days. This 
distrust manifested itself in restrictive naturalization laws and virulent rhetoric against certain 
ethnic and religious groups. See SCIRP, supra note 43, at 161-200. 
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limitless growth and developed instead into an urban and industrial 
society with more restricted growth, liberal ideology faded. Funda-
mental economic, political, and social changes gave birth to a new ide-
ology of "restrictive nationalism," which manifested itself in a legal 
order Schuck terms "classical immigration law."91 Exclusionary reac-
tions to immigrants92 resulted in an ideology which altered the source 
of aliens' rights and duties. Under liberal ideology, an alien's rights 
and duties were seen to stem from his or her right to freely contract 
with others. Under restrictive nationalism, however, the alien's legal 
status was defined by "the national government's consent to allow the 
alien to enter and remain, which consent could be denied or with-
drawn on the basis of arbitrary criteria and summary procedures that 
often transgressed liberal principles."93 
Not surprisingly, the first pronouncements of judicial restraint in 
the immigration area came in the early years of classical immigration 
law. The Supreme Court recognized early the plenary power of Con-
gress in the immigration field94 and made sweeping denials of its own 
power to control the legislature's actions.95 The result is an exagger-
91. Schuck, supra note 87, at 3. 
92. Id. ("Liberal values were challenged by an array of exclusionary impulses - racist and 
class-based opposition to Chinese laborers, nativist xenophobia, religious bigotry, and political 
reaction against radical movements drawing upon new immigrant groups.") (footnote omitted). 
See generally Note, supra note 39, at 306-09 (describing early immigration legislation). 
93. Schuck, supra note 87, at 3 (footnote omitted). Schuck identifies three causes of the shift 
to classical immigration law. First, the focus of immigration shifted from Protestant, northern or 
western European nations to Catholic, eastern or southern European countries, and the Orient. 
Americans reacted with a rising well of distrust of these racially and religiously "different" 
aliens. Id. at 5-6. For a more detailed account of the reaction to the changing face of American 
immigration, see SCIRP, supra note 43, at 161-200. The reaction to Asian immigration was 
particularly violent. In fact, the start of the classical immigration period can almost be marked 
by the passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), the first racist, restric-
tionist immigration statute enacted in the United States. 
Second, American society developed a new "nationalistic" sense as it matured into an indus-
trialized world power, leading to an increased sense of national autonomy and world leadership. 
Schuck, supra note 87, at 6. Finally, restrictionist immigration policy grew out of the nation's 
conception of its own sovereignty: "Sovereignty entailed the unlimited power of the nation, like 
that of the free individual, to decide whether, under what conditions, and with what effects it 
would consent to enter into a relationship with a stranger." Id. Thus, the only obligations the 
government was perceived as owing to an alien were those it voluntarily undertook. Id. 
94. See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 724 (1893) (aliens are "subject to 
the power of Congress to expel them or to order them to be removed and deported from the 
country, whenever in its judgment their removal is necessary or expedient for the public inter-
est"); Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892) ("It is an accepted maxim of 
international law, that every sovereign nation has the power, as inherent in sovereignty, and 
essential to self-preservation, to forbid the entrance of foreigners within its dominions, or to 
admit them only in such cases and upon such conditions as it may see fit to prescribe."). 
The immigration power has historically been vested in the legislative branch of the govern-
ment. See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 767 (1972) (quoting Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 
522, 531 (1954)) ("[T]hat the formulation of [immigration and naturalization] policies is en-
trusted exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly embedded in the legislative and judi-
cial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our federal government."); 1 C. GORDON & H. 
ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, §§ I.Sa, 2.2a. 
95. The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) ("[If Congress] considers the pres-
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ated judicial deference to laws governing the admission, exclusion, and 
deportation of aliens which persists to the present.96 
The restrictive tide of classical immigration law has only recently 
shown signs of receding. Professor Schuck has identified an emerging 
ideological shift in immigration law, in which the focus is not on the 
government's omnipotent sovereignty, but rather on the "essential and 
equal humanity" of individuals.97 Under this "communitarian" vision 
of immigration law, the government's duties extend "to all individuals 
who manage to reach America's shores, even to strangers whom it has 
never undertaken, and has no wish, to protect. "98 Communitarianism 
reaches back to liberal ideology to find that all individuals possess cer-
tain universal rights simply because they are human beings. This new 
view emphasizes the "social interactions and commitments" between 
ence of foreigners of a different race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to be dan-
gerous to its peace and security, •.• its determination is conclusive upon the judiciary."). The 
Court's denial of its own power in this area remains good law today: 
At the outset, it is important to underscore the limited scope of judicial inquiry into 
immigration legislation. This Court has repeatedly emphasized that "over no conceivable 
subject is the legislative power of Congress more complete than it is over" the admission of 
aliens. Our cases "have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as a fundamen-
tal sovereign attribute exercised by the Government's political departments largely immune 
from judicial control." Our recent decisions have not departed from this long-established 
rule. 
Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (citations omitted); accord Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 
U.S. 753, 766 (1972); Oceanic Stream Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 340 (1909). 
The Court has afforded similar deference to administrative officials as well. See INS v. Miranda, 
459 U.S. 14, 19 (1982) (per curiam) ("[T]he INS is the agency primarily charged by Congress to 
implement the public policy underlying [immigration] laws. Appropriate deference must be ac-
corded its decisions.") (citations omitted); INS v. John Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 145 (1981) (per 
curiam). 
96. This judicial deference has been termed the "plenary power" doctrine. See generally 
Legomsky, supra note 88 (discussing plenary power doctrine, which the Supreme Court has cited 
in declining to review immigration laws for compliance with substantive constitutional limits). 
Laws affecting aliens' rights and obligations (e.g., their eligibility for welfare programs or their 
duty to serve in the armed forces) are subject to limited review for rationality if challenged as 
discriminatory. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 82-83 (1976); Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 
611 (1960); see also Legomsky, supra note 88, at 256. The courts will also review congressional 
actions regarding deportation to ensure that the aliens are afforded procedural due process. 
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950); The Japanese Immigrant Cases, 189 U.S. 86, 
100 (1903) (dictum); see also Legomsky, supra note 88, at 259. Although the plenary power 
doctrine applies only to congressional actions, its effects have been extended to cover INS actions 
in some instances. Id. at 257. In reviewing administrative decisions in the immigration field, 
courts generally will inquire only as to whether the decision was irrational or in bad faith. See, 
e.g., Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 211-13 (2d Cir. 1982); El-Werfalli v. Smith, 547 F. Supp. 
152, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). For a discussion of the possible rationales for this deference, see 
Schuck, supra note 87, at 14-18; Developments, supra note 90, at 1314-22. 
97. Schuck, supra note 87, at 4. This shift has been noted by other authors as well. See, e.g., 
Legomsky, supra note 88, at 306-07; Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Com-
munity: Political Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Prrr. L. REV. 165, 193-200 (1983); Verkuil, supra 
note 87, at 1143-44 (adopting Schuck's classification of the history of immigration law); Develop-
ments, supra note 90, at 1289-90 (adopting a somewhat different classification, but stating that 
aliens' rights can be viewed in two ways: as augmenting the national welfare or as intrinsic to 
their human worth). 
98. Schuck, supra note 89, at 4. 
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aliens and the government as the source of the government's duty to-
ward those aliens, rather than governmental consent.99 
Communitarianism is by no means an established approach to im-
migration law.100 Yet the pressures for changet0 t are mounting, and 
the first faint flickerings of this new ideology are apparent. 102 Thus, 
we see decisions that imply that long-term resident aliens are members 
of our national community and thus entitled to various rights, 103 deci-
sions evidencing increased judicial assertiveness, 104 and decisions cre-
ating increased procedural and substantive rights for deportable and 
detained aliens. 10s 
99. Communitarianism is, of course, subject to varying definitions. As one scholar noted: 
Communitarianism is a hazy term used to describe any number of different political 
theories, which may range from conservative Burkean notions to radical left conceptions of 
the state. Several ideas, however, that seem central to most accounts, are relevant to an 
understanding of citizenship. Communitarian theory begins with individuals situated in a 
real society, not in a hypothetical state of nature or on the brink of contract. The individual 
is seen as an "encumbered" self. He is defined - or constituted - in part by his relation-
ships, roles, and allegiances. His relationship with the state is based on his identification 
with and immersion in the society's history, traditions, and core assumptions and purposes. 
If the bywords of liberal theory are freedom, choice, and consent, the bywords of communi-
tarian theory are solidarity, responsibility, and civic virtue. The operative metaphors for the 
state are "family," "community," or "a people." From the communitarian perspective, citi-
zenship is seen as an organic relationship between the citizen and the state. 
Aleinikolf, Theories of Loss of Citizenship, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1471, 1494 (1986) (footnote omit-
ted). An analysis of the merits of the competing definitions is beyond the scope of this Note. 
Thus, this Note adopts Professor $chuck's definition. 
100. Schuck notes that "communitarianism in immigration law is as yet only embryonic, 
tentative, and fragmentary." Schuck, Immigration Law and the Problem of Community, in 
CLAMOR AT THE GATES 298 (N. Glazer ed. 1985). Certainly, this ideological shift is apparent 
only at the lower federal court level and has shown no signs of appearing in the Supreme Court 
yet. See Legomsky, supra note 88, at 304; Schuck, supra note 87, at 58-59; Developments, supra 
note 90, at 1313. Moreover, since the executive branch actually sets immigration policy, it 
should be noted that the Reagan administration has thus far shown little intention of adopting 
this view. 
101. Schuck discusses five structural pressures for changes: the constraining of American 
foreign policy, economic changes, increases in refugee and asylum claims, large numbers of ille-
gal aliens, and political shifts caused by changes in the ethnic make-up and geographical concen-
tration of minority groups. Schuck, supra note 87, at 35-47. He identifies several ideological 
pressures for change as well: "altered beliefs about the meaning of justice, the rightness or 
wrongness of certain actions, and the proper role of law and of particular legal institutions in 
society." Id. at 34. See generally id. at 47-53. 
102. Schuck identifies seven elements of classical immigration law undergoing this ideologi-
cal transformation: 
(1) the restrictive ideal of national community; (2) the principle of judicial deference; (3) the 
extraconstitutional status of exclusion; (4) the broad federal power to classify aliens; (5) the 
civil nature of the deportation sanction; (6) the detention power; and (7) the integration of 
adjudication and enforcement. 
Id. at 7-8. 1 
103. See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (states obligated to provide public education to 
undocumented school-age aliens). Although, as Schuck notes, Plyler involved invalidation of a 
state, not a federal, Jaw, it nonetheless has important implications for the notion of a national 
community, since the Court ordered a state to provide a social benefit to aliens whose presence in 
the United States was in direct violation of federal law. See Schuck, supra note 87, at 54-58. 
104. Schuck discusses Employees Union in this context. See note 178 infra. 
105. See Schuck, supra note 87, at 62-65. 
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The increased infusion of moral values into law that necessarily 
accompanies communitarianism has important procedural implica-
tions.106 Traditionally, aliens were perceived as having few or no pro-
cedural rights. 107 If we admit that aliens are entitled to some 
procedural protection, however - either by virtue of their ties to the 
United States108 or simply because of their basic humanity - we are 
forced to consider competing interests: the alien's interest in avoiding 
arbitrary government decisionmaking109 versus the government's in-
terest in avoiding fiscal and administrative burdens110 and in prevent-
ing the entry of aliens not entitled to the benefits of our society.111 
EVD presents a revealing opportunity to consider these individual and 
governmental concerns in the context of discretionary decisionmaking 
by the Attorney General. 
B. The Application of Communitarianism to EVD 
In denying judicial review in Employees Union, the court adopted 
the classical view of immigration law. EVD, like most forms of discre-
tionary relief, has no procedural safeguards provided by statute or reg-
ulation.112 Moreover, discretionary decisions to suspend enforcement 
of the deportation laws have traditionally been considered nonreview-
able exercises of prosecutorial discretion.113 In effect, the Employees 
Union court weighed the interests of the two parties involved and 
found the scales grossly lopsided. On one side, it had an exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion by the Attorney General involving immigra-
tion and, impliedly, foreign affairs - interests traditionally subject to 
extremely narrow review. On the other side, it had a demand for judi-
cial review by a group traditionally deemed to have only those limited 
rights the government chooses to grant it. 
An examination of EVD through the lens of the communitarian-
106. See generally Verkuil, supra note 87. 
107. The Supreme Court has long held that aliens being deported are entitled to a modicum 
of procedure. See The Japanese Immigrant Cases, 189 U.S. 86 (1903) (aliens in deportation 
process entitled to due process protection). Aliens seeking entry to the United States have no 
such right, however. See Landon v. Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32 (1982) ("This Court has long held 
that an alien seeking initial admission to the United States requests a privilege and has no consti-
tutional rights regarding his application, for the power to admit or exclude aliens is a sovereign 
prerogative.") (citations omitted); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 
(1953); United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). 
108. See Verkuil, supra note 87, at 1149-53 for a suggestion of how those ties might be 
measured. 
109. Id. at 1149. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1155. 
112. See generally Sofaer, Judicial Control of Informal Discretionary Adjudication and En-
forcement, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 1293 (1972). 
113. See Soon Bok Yoon v. INS, 538 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir. 1976) (no judicial review of 
decision to deny deferred departure status); cf notes 56 & 67 supra and accompanying text. 
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ism view of immigration law, however, reveals that the Salvadoran 
nationals have important interests at stake that can be protected only 
by judicial review. Salvadoran nationals, though present illegally in 
the United States, have a very strong interest in not being returned to 
the dangers of their homeland.114 That interest should not be disre-
garded and, at the very least, entitles the Salvadorans to procedural 
fairness. Though few would argue that these aliens have an incontro-
vertible right to remain in the United States, the judicial deference 
traditionally accorded immigration law seems misplaced in this in-
stance. If we examine the nature of EVD grants more critically, we 
see that Employees Union involved precisely the sort of governmental 
action which should be subject to judicial review. 
IV. THE SOURCE OF EVD 
An examination of the source of the Attorney General's power to 
grant EVD status reveals that this relief is not merely a gratuitous 
decision not to enforce the immigration laws, but rather an affirmative 
action conferring special benefits on the aliens involved. Thus, the 
Employees Union court's characterization of EVD as "prosecutorial 
discretion" is conclusory; application of such a label enables the court 
to avoid examining the underlying reasons for the Attorney General's 
decision and to ignore the substantive impacts of this status on the 
aliens who receive it. us 
A. EVD as Prosecutorial Discretion 
The Employees Union court's characterization of EVD as an exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion is accurate in one sense. The INS has 
neither the fiscal nor the administrative resources to initiate deporta-
tion hearings against every illegal alien it finds in the United States. 116 
Thus, the INS exercises prosecutorial discretion in deciding which 
aliens will be excused from deportation proceedings and in setting the 
terms and duration of their stay.117 This discretion has become more 
focused as the INS has created specific forms of discretionary deporta-
tion relief and has promulgated standards for granting that relief. 118 It 
114. See note 7 supra. 
115. In all fairness to the Employees Union court, it had no reason not to classify EVD as 
prosecutorial discretion, since the parties themselves used that label. See note 56 supra. The 
arguments set forth in this Note, for example, were not before the court. 
116. The National Academy of Sciences estimates that there are 2 to 4 million illegal aliens 
in the United States. See N.Y. Times, June 25, 1985, at Al4, col. t. Other studies estimate that 
illegal aliens number about 3.5 to 6 million. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 485, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 
(1982); GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PROBLEMS AND OPTIONS JN EsrlMATING THE SIZE 
OF THE ILLEGAL ALIEN POPULATION ii (1982). 
117. See Roberts, The Exercise of Administrative Discretion Under the Immigration Laws, 13 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 144, 146 (1975). 
118. See IA C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 5.3e (discussing various forms of 
prosecutive relief for aliens facing deportation); see also Gordon, Ameliorating Hardships Under 
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is misleading, however, to analogize too closely these forms of discre-
tionary relief to the most common form of prosecutorial discretion -
that which arises in the criminal context. 
The judiciary has generally accorded great deference to exercises of 
prosecutorial discretion in the criminal setting.119 Courts assume that 
a prosecutor's resources are so limited that he or she cannot prosecute 
all offenders120 and that, in any event, leniency is warranted in some 
cases.121 A number of other factors may influence the prosecutor's 
decision to charge, including uncertainty about the defendant's 
guilt, 122 the perceived likelihood of conviction, 123 and the potential for 
deterrence of others.124 Because the courts consider these matters to 
be exclusively within the prosecutor's discretion, his or her decision is 
virtually unreviewable.12s 
An agency's determination to enforce or not "involves a compli-
cated balancing of a number of factors" 126 similar to those found in 
the criminal setting: 
[T]he agency must not only assess whether a violation has occurred, but 
whether agency resources are best spent on this violation or another, 
whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the particular 
enforcement action requested best fits the agency's overall policies, and 
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action 
the Immigration Laws, 367 ANNALS 85 (1966); Keane, Changing Concepts in Discretionary Re-
lief. 12 I & N REP. 30 (1964); Roberts, Relief from Deportation: Discretion and Waivers, 55 
INTERPRETER RELEASES 184, 187 (1978). 
119. See, e.g., United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 784-85, 792-96 (1977)(affirming prose-
cutor's discretion to delay filing charges for eighteen months pending results of good-faith inves-
tigation); United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 412-15 (1920) (affirming prosecutor's 
discretion to present charges to second grand jury after first grand jury has declined to indict); 
United States v. Ruggiero, 472 F.2d 599, 606 (2d Cir. 1973) (affirming prosecutor's discretion in 
determining what to charge), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973). 
120. See, e.g., United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1978); Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 
HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (1981). 
121. See, e.g., Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481-82 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Givelber, 
The Application of Equal Protection Principles to Selective Enforcement of the Criminal Law, 1973 
U. ILL. L.F. 88, 101-02. 
122. Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion - A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L. REv. 174, 178 
(1965). 
123. See, e.g., United States v. Heilman, 614 F.2d 1133, 1139 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
447 U.S. 922 (1980); United States v. Scott, 521 F.2d 1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 
U.S. 955 (1976); Kaplan, supra note 122, at 180. 
124. See, e.g., United States v. Saade, 652 F.2d 1126, 1136 (1st Cir. 1981); United States v. 
Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th Cir. 1978). 
125. See, e.g., United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir. 1974) Gudicial review of 
prosecutorial discretion available only where defendant meets the "heavy burden" of showing 
both that others similarly situated were not prosecuted and that he was selected for prosecution 
on an unconstitutional basis); Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 
375, 380 (2d Cir. 1973) ("[T]he manifold imponderables which enter into the prosecutor's deci-
sion to prosecute or not to prosecute make the choice not readily amenable to judicial supervi-
sion."); 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE§ 9.1, at 217-18 (2d ed. 1979). 
126. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985). 
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Likewise, agency exercises of prosecutorial discretion are subject to 
very limited review for abuse of discretion. 128 
The analogy between prosecutorial discretion in the criminal con-
text and prosecutorial discretion in the agency context collapses upon 
close examination, however. The two settings give rise to exercises of 
discretion which are fundamentally different. An exercise of 
prosecutorial discretion in a criminal setting is directed toward past 
behavior; the act has already occurred and only the societal interest in 
punishing the guilty remains.129 Exercises of prosecutorial discretion 
in the agency setting, on the other hand, can be proactive, not merely 
reactive, in effect. 130 As Justice Marshall noted, "[t]he interests at 
stake in review of administrative enforcement decisions are . . . more 
focused and in many circumstances more pressing than those at stake 
in criminal prosecutorial decisions."131 
The Attorney General's decision to grant or deny EVD status well 
exemplifies this phenomenon. A decision to forego prosecution in a 
criminal case preserves the status quo; the potential defendant, who is 
presumed innocent until proven guilty, remains innocent.132 A grant 
of EVD, on the other hand, is not merely a decision "to suspend en-
127. 470 U.S. at 831. 
128. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832-33 (1985) (court can review agency 
decision to enforce to determine whether agency exceeded its statutory powers); United States v. 
Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 271 (9th Cir. 1970) ("The conscious exercise of selectivity in enforcement 
[of alien registration laws] is not in itself a constitutional violation where it is not further alleged 
that 'the selection was deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or 
other arbitrary classification.'") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903 (1970). The 
Supreme Court has erected a presumption of nonreviewability for agency decisions not to en· 
force, stating that "when an agency refuses to act it generally does not exercise its coercive power 
over an individual's liberty or property rights, and thus does not infringe upon areas that courts 
often are called upon to protect.'' Heckler, 470 U.S. at 832 (emphasis in original). See also 
Shapiro, Administrative Discretion: The Next Stage, 92 YALE L.J. 1487, 1509-11 (1983). 
129. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 847 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("Criminal 
prosecutorial decisions vindicate only intangible interests, common to society as a whole, in the 
enforcement of the criminal law. The conduct at issue has already occurred; all that remains is 
society's general interest in assuring that the guilty are punished."). 
130. Cf. Wildes, The Nonpriority Program of the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
Goes Public: The Litigative Use of the Freedom of Information Act, 14 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 42, 72 
(1976) (arguing that nonpriority program is unlike criminal prosecutorial discretion in that the 
program is a special program conferring benefits "based on individual equities"). 
131. Heckler, 470 U.S. at 848. In this case, Justice Marshall noted in response to an agency 
refusal to act that 
requests for administrative enforcement typically seek to prevent concrete and future inju-
ries that Congress has made cognizable ..• or to obtain palpable benefits that Congress has 
intended to bestow .... Entitlements to receive these benefits or to be free of these injuries 
often run to specific classes of individuals whom Congress has singled out as statutory 
beneficiaries. 
470 U.S. at 847-48 (citations omitted). A similar rationale would apply to agency decisions to 
act. 
132. See Vorenberg, supra note 120, at 1525. 
October 1986] Note - Extended Voluntary Departure 175 
forcement of the immigration laws,"133 but rather is an affirmative ac-
tion conferring important legal privileges on the aliens involved. All 
aliens in the relevant class, regardless of their legal status, are entitled 
to remain in the United States while the grant remains in effect and are 
eligible to receive work authorization from the INS during their 
stay. 134 Although the aliens are technically deportable, a grant of 
EVD allows them to conduct their affairs in any manner they choose 
as long as they remain in the United States.135 Recipients of EVD 
thus acquire significant advantages which belie the notion that they 
are merely passive beneficiaries of the Attorney General's discretion-
ary decision to eschew prosecution. 
The Employees Uni·on court's failure to investigate fully the nature 
of EVD did a grave disservice to the Salvadoran nationals by allowing 
the Attorney General to hide behind the cloak of prosecutorial discre-
133. Employees Union, 594 F. Supp. at 507; see note 56 supra and accompanying text; cf 
Letter from William F. Smith, Attorney General, to Representative Lawrence J. Smith (July 
19,1983), reprinted in Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 6, at Exhibit D (describing EVD as 
a temporary delay in the expulsion of aliens of a certain nationality). 
134. INS regulations provide that certain classes of aliens are eligible to be employed in the 
United States without specific employment authorization. 8 C.F.R. § 109.l(a) (1986). Aliens 
granted voluntary departure under 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(2)(viii) (1986), see text at note 26 supra, 
must apply for work authorization under 8 C.F.R. § 109.l(b)(6) (1986) and 
may be granted permission to be employed for that period of time prior to the date set for 
voluntary departure including any extension granted beyond such date. Factors which may 
be considered in granting employment authorization to an alien who has been granted vol-
untary departure: 
(i) Length of voluntary departure granted; 
(ii) Dependent spouse and/or children in the United States who rely on the alien for 
support; · 
(iii) Reasonable chance that legal status may ensue in the near future; and 
(iv) Reasonable basis for consideration of discretionary relief. 
8 C.F.R. § 109.l(b)(6) (1986). The INS manual reveals that work authorizations are issued auto-
matically to aliens granted extensions of voluntary departure: "Aliens who have been granted 
•.. voluntary departure due to temporary inability to return to their home country because of 
civil war or catastrophic circumstances there, should be advised of their status by letter .... The 
letter should state that ... employment has been authorized .... " IMMIGRATION AND NATU-
RALIZATION SERVICE, OPERATING INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS & INTERPRETATIONS§ 242. 
10(e)(3) (Apr. 4, 1979). Likewise, the directives notifying the INS field offices of the Attorney 
General's decision to grant EVD typically provide for work authorization in accordance with the 
voluntary departure provisions. See, e.g., INS Wire of June 15, 1983, reprinted in 60 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 484 (1983) ("Those Polish nationals whose departure has been deferred until 
December 31, 1983 and who establish appropriate need may be authorized permission to work, 
as provided in 8 C.F.R. 109. l(b)."); see also INS Wire of May 1, 1984, reprinted in 61 INTER-
PRETER RELEASES 330 (1984) (work authorizations for Ugandans granted EVD); INS Wire of 
July 12, 1982, reprinted in 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 456 (1982) (work authorizations for 
Ethiopians granted EVD). The authors of one book noted that "there is no special program 
[available to aliens granted EVD) for federal assistance like that available to refugees ... , but it 
may be that EVD beneficiaries qualify for other general public assistance programs otherwise 
closed to 'illegal aliens.' " T.A. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, supra note 5, at 728 (citations 
omitted). 
135. See Resettlement of Cuban Refugees, 41 INTERPRETER RELEASES 98, 99 (1964); cf 
SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, SUBCOMM. TO INVESTIGATE PROBLEMS CONNECTED 
WITH REFUGEES AND EsCAPEES PURSUANT TO S. RES. 66, 88TH CONG., lST SESS., RESETTLE· 
MENT OF CUBAN REFUGEES 1 (Comm. Print 1963) (introduction by Sen. Hart). 
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tion. Though most forms of deportation relief are properly termed 
"prosecutorial discretion,"136 this term does not mean that the actions 
are automatically immune from judicial review. Despite the judici-
ary's general reluctance to review discretionary decisions, 137 the courts 
will intervene in cases of "clear abuse of discretion."138 To determine 
the scope of judicial review that should be applied to EVD decisions, it 
is necessary to identify the underlying statutory authority for the 
grants. 
B. The Statutory Source of EVD 
The Attorney General's authority to grant EVD has never been 
challenged; therefore, the source of this power has never been fully 
examined. Closer scrutiny reveals that EVD is actually a group appli-
cation of another form of administratively-provided deportation relief 
- extensions of voluntary departure. 
EVD, like all other variations of voluntary departure, originates in 
the INA provisions which empower the Attorney General with discre-
tionary authority to grant voluntary departure. 139 The Act sets basic 
eligibility requirements which the alien must meet before he or she will 
be considered for this relief. 140 Award of the status to eligible aliens is 
solely within the discretion of the immigration authorities. 141 
In addition to this "routine" type of voluntary departure, 142 the 
INS has created extensions of voluntary departure. 143 As mentioned 
in Part I, this relief is granted in a number of situations, 144 including 
cases where deportation of the alien would result in excessive hard-
ship.145 Although the regulations are vague, 146 the Operations In-
structions indicate that aliens who are temporarily unable "to return 
to their home country because of civil war or catastrophic circum-
stances there"147 may receive a one-year extension of voluntary depar-
136. See note 117 supra and accompanying text. 
137. See note 167 infra and accompanying text. 
138. See note 166 infra and accompanying text. 
139. See note 18 supra. 
140. These requirements vary, depending upon whether the alien is requesting voluntary de· 
parture before, during, or after deportation proceedings, but, in general, they go to the moral 
worthiness of the alien. See notes 19 & 20 supra. See generally 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, 
supra note 1, § 7.2. 
141. See, e.g., Gomez-Fernandez v. INS, 316 F.2d 732 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 942 
(1963); Hegerich v. Del Guercio, 255 F.2d 701 (9th Cir. 1958); United States ex rel Ciannamea 
v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 289 (7th Cir. 1953). 
142. See notes 18-24 supra and accompanying text. 
143. See notes 25-32 supra and accompanying text. 
144. See notes 25-30 supra and accompanying text. 
145. See notes 26 & 27 supra and accompanying text. 
146. See text at note 26 supra. 
147. INS, OPERATIONS INSTRUCTIONS, REGULATIONS & INTERPRETATIONS§ 242.10(e)(3) 
(Apr. 4, 1979). 
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ture and employment authorization. 
The Attorney General has delegated his authority to grant these 
various types of voluntary departure to certain INS officials.148 Their 
determinations are made on an individual basis and, like grants of vol-
untary departure, involve a two-step process. The official must first 
determine whether the alien meets the preliminary standards for eligi-
bility set forth in the statute and regulations. Once the alien has been 
found to meet the criteria for consideration, the official then has dis-
cretion to grant him or her relief.149 
EVD is nothing more than an en masse grant of extensions of vol-
untary departure made by the Attorney General, rather than by his 
subordinates. Although the wording of the statutory authority for 
voluntary departure seems to contemplate individual150 rather than en 
masse determinations, the Attorney General is entitled to make blan-
ket grants as well. 151 What the Attorney General is not entitled to do 
is to alter the parameters of his discretion at will and without adequate 
explanation. 
Although the Attorney General has never formulated any stan-
dards regarding his exercise of discretion in this area, he has nonethe-
less created a de facto standard through his past grants of EVD. Past 
grants of this status have always been accompanied by explanations of 
the "humanitarian" reasons militating for such status. 152 The criteria 
148. See 8 C.F.R. § 242.5(a)(l) (1986). 
149. See 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note l, § 7.lb, at pp. 7-9 to 7-13. 
150. See notes 19 & 20 supra. 
151. In Fook Hong Mak v. INS, 435 F.2d 728 (2d Cir. 1970), the Second Circuit established 
that administrators vested with discretionary authority may exercise that authority through blan-
ket, rather than individual, determinations. 435 F.2d at 730; see also Yuk-Ling Wu Jew v. Attor-
ney General, 524 F. Supp. 1258, 1260-61 (D.D.C. 1981) ("A congressional grant of discretion to 
accord or revoke an immigration privilege does not trigger a requirement that each such proceed-
ing be considered on a case by case basis."); cf. Kurian v. Callaway, 381 F. Supp. 594, 596 
(S.D.N.Y.), ajfd. in part and revd. in part, 510 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1974) (state executive may 
exercise his discretion on either a blanket or a case-by-case basis). The Attorney General may 
determine that "one paramount element creates such 'likeness' that other elements cannot be so 
legally significant as to warrant a difference in treatment." Fook Hong Mak, 435 F.2d at 730. 
This principle is particularly applicable to EVD, since the "one characteristic" which entitles the 
"group to favorable treatment despite minor variables," 435 F.2d at 730, is readily apparent. If 
conditions in the home country are so dangerous as to warrant EVD status for the nationals, 
case-by-case determinations become a time-consuming administrative burden. A blanket grant is 
an efficient and sensible response, since it relieves the field officers from the procedural formalities 
of individual determinations in cases in which the outcome is certain. 
152. See, e.g., Letter from A.P. Drischler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Congres-
sional Relations, to Senator Edward Kennedy (Apr. 17, 1981), reprinted in 128 CONG. REc. 1702 
(1982) ("While fighting in some areas has been severe, El Salvador has not suffered the same level 
of wide-spread fighting, destruction and breakdown of public services and order as did for exam-
ple, Nicaragua, Lebanon or Uganda at the time when voluntary departure was recommended by 
the Department [of Justice] and granted by INS for nationals of those countries."); INS Wire of 
Jan. 21, 1982, reprinted in 59 INTERPRETER RELEASES 85 (1982) ("Service action shall not be 
taken to enforce departure to Poland, . . . at the present time under the unstable conditions 
currently existing there."); INS Wire of July 3, 1979, reprinted in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 
325a (1979) ("Service action shall not be taken to enforce departure to Nicaragua, prior to De-
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used in granting this status have effectively defined the class to which 
the Attorney General may, in his discretion, extend EVD. 153 
cember 31, 1979, of Nicaraguan nationals ... who indicate an unwillingness to return to that 
country at the present time under the unstable conditions currently existing there.") (emphasis in 
original); INS Wire of Aug. 29, 1979, reprinted in 56 INTERPRETER RELEASES 436 (1979) ("The 
Department of State has recommended against the forcible return to Nicaragua of any Nicara· 
guan nationals ... due to the unsettled conditions in Nicaragua."); INS Wire of Dec. 4, 1978 
(copy on file at Michigan Law Review) ("The civil strife in that country [Lebanon] continues."); 
Letter of William P. Clark, Deputy Secretary of State, to Doris Meissner, Acting Commissioner 
of INS (Aug. 8, 1981) (copy on file at Michigan Law Review) ("Since Ethiopia's revolution took 
place in 1974 the Department of State has been recommending to the INS that ••• because of 
unsettled conditions in Ethiopia, Ethiopians whose asylum applications were not approved 
should not be deported to Ethiopia .... "). 
Gordon and Rosenfield have also noted that the Attorney General sometimes grants EVD 
status to "nationals of countries undergoing active hostilities or other dangerous conditions." IA 
c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note I, § 5.3e(6a), at p. 5-48. The INS itself has described 
EVD as "an administratively clean and effective response for our government to make to what 
are generally temporary but unsafe circumstances in other countries that are likely to improve 
with time." INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note I, at 71. This also seems to be the view 
taken by many members of Congress. See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 4447, supra note 7, at 10 (state· 
ment of Rep. Moakley) ("The issue here is not administration foreign policy toward El Salvador 
. . • . The issue today is a humanitarian one .... [W]e are deciding, in light of all of the docu-
mented human rights violations in El Salvador, whether it is safe, humane, and just to deport 
Salvadoran refugees back to their homeland."); id. at 49 (statement of Rep. Gejdenson) (EVD "is 
a humanitarian decision, not a political one."). Congressmen expressed this view in connection 
with earlier grants ofEVD as well. For example, debate on H. Res. 304 (urging EVD status for 
Poles) exemplified congressional preoccupation with the humanitarian aspects of EVD. See 127 
CONG. REc. 31,493 (1981) (statement of Mr. Rodino) ("[F)avorable action on this resolution 
would be a clear expression of our humanitarian commitment to these individuals and a recogni· 
tion of our obligation not to return them, at this time, to Poland."); id., at 31,494 (statement of 
Mr. Richmond) ("Our Nation's humanitarian tradition demands that we not expel those whose 
lives would be threatened by deportation and it is, therefore, imperative that we permit Polish 
citizens to remain here until they can safely return home."); id. (statement of Mr. Broomfield) 
("[I)t is the humanitarian obligation of the United States to insure that Poles visiting or working 
in the United States are not thrust back into Poland now."). 
153. The Attorney General has denied that any criteria for granting the status exist. See, 
e.g., Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 6, at 16 ("Plaintiffs erroneously assume that grants of 
'extended voluntary departure' are governed exclusively by conditions within the country(ies) in 
question ... and that it is both possible and proper to draw country-by-country comparisons 
between the Executive's determinations concerning 'extended voluntary departure.' "); Letter 
from George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, to William F. Smith, Attorney General (June 23, 
1983) reprinted in Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 6, at Exhibit C ("[T)he extent of civil 
unrest alone does not determine the Department's view toward the granting of EVD to nationals 
of a particular country. The Department invariably considers a number of factors in deciding 
whether to recommend the granting of EVD in any particular case, and the granting of EVD 
may meet different objectives in different cases.''). The Attorney General stated that: 
[I)t is true ... that "extended voluntary departure" has been granted to nationals of Ethio-
pia, Nicaragua, Poland, and Uganda, at times when such countries were experiencing signif· 
icant civil disturbances. It is inaccurate, however, to assume that there exists any specific 
criterion or criteria, such as the occurrence of violence or political instability, by which 
grants of "extended voluntary departure" are determined. . • . The decisions made as to 
"extended voluntary departure" are reached on a situation by situation basis and are not 
readily susceptible to comparison or generalization. Each determination is based on exami· 
nation of a variety of factors unique to each country's situation. 
Letter from William F. Smith, Attorney General, to Representative Lawrence J. Smith (July 19, 
1983) reprinted in Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 6, at Exhibit D. 
The government has asserted that EVD serves primarily as a foreign policy tool. See Memo· 
randum from William F. Smith, Attorney General, to William Clark (Apr. 16, 1983), quoted i11 
Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 37, at 63 n.14 (emphasis added): 
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In denying EVD to Salvadorans, however, the Attorney General 
has attempted to redefine the class. Foreign and domestic policy con-
Historically, a grant of extended voluntary departure to a particular national group by 
the Attorney General has always been based on a recommendation of the Department of 
State resulting from its assessment of conditions in a particular country and the foreign 
policy implications of U.S. Government action in repatriating nationals of that country who 
are in the United States. 
[The Department of] Justice has never independently established an extended voluntary 
departure program as the need for and implications of such a decision are fundamentally 
foreign policy in nature. 
Granting extended voluntary departure to nationals of one country does not justify or re-
quire such a grant to nationals of another country where, while the situation may or may not 
be similar. the foreign policy benefits or issues may be adjudged to be different. 
The general perception of extended voluntary departure is that it is invoked as a humani-
tarian gesture to protect temporarily persons who are in the U.S. and subject to return when 
conditions of civil strife or social or political turmoil arise in their homeland. While human-
itarian factors have always loomed large in extended voluntary departure decisions, State's 
recommendation has, with varying degrees, been based on foreign policy grounds. 
The plaintiffs in Employees Union argued, however, that the government's assertion that 
EVD is merely a foreign policy tool is no more than a post-hoc rationalization formulated after 
the filing of the complaint in that case, see Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 37, at 63-64, since 
humanitarian concerns, not foreign policy objectives, were asserted in connection with earlier 
grants of EVD. See note 152 supra. While it is true that the granting of EVD may have some 
influence upon relations between the United States and the involved country, the impact is likely 
negligible, as the government itself has recognized. See, e.g., Draft Questions and Answers for 
Elliot Abrams (Feb. 5, 1982, 3:00 p.m. press briefing), quoted in Plaintiffs' Opposition, supra note 
37, at 62: 
[QUESTION]: Is it not true that if you were to grant asylum or voluntary departure status 
to a high proportion of applicants for many or all of the Salvadorans in the US [sic], in effect 
you would be disparaging the stability and ability of the Salvadoran Government to protect 
its citizens? Would this not undermine the Administration's policy of support for the Du-
arte government? 
[ANSWER]: The decision to grant asylum or voluntary departure unavoidably reflects 
upon the conditions currently existing in the homeland of the persons affected. In the case 
of El Salvador, you must remember that a civil war is occurring. That the government 
cannot maintain perfect order in such circumstances is unsurprising and does not necessar-
ily reflect poorly on it or its leaders. When these facts are considered, I cannot see how the 
Administration's policy could be harmed. 
The granting of EVD to nationals of both Nicaragua and Lebanon at a time when these 
countries were engaged in favorable relations with the United States further illustrates that EVD 
has, in the past, functioned as humanitarian relief and not as a pejorative denouncement of the 
governments involved. In fact, the Salvadoran Ambassador to the United States stated that El 
Salvador "view[s] with great sympathy the U.S. policy of granting 'extended departure' status" 
to Salvadoran nationals, thus diminishing the likelihood that a grant of EVD would be deleteri-
ous to U.S.-Salvadoran relations. Eastham, Salvadorans Seek U.S. Asylum from U.S.-Backed 
Regime, United Press International, Mar. 20, 1982 (available on NEXIS). Moreover, as one 
commentator noted, the Salvadoran government "should not be too surprised or offended" to 
find out that the U.S. government believes El Salvador to be unsafe for civilians, given the critical 
State Department reports on human rights in that country filed with Congress. See Note, supra 
note 5, at 330·31. 
Finally, EVD grants, unlike grants of refugee status, can be framed in terms that do not 
condemn the government of the aliens involved: 
Since a refugee is defined contentiously as victim or potential victim of persecution, to ac-
cept the claim of someone to qualify for refugee status is publicly to accuse some other state 
of engaging in persecution; to accept large numbers of refugees is to call attention to the 
extent of other states' misdeeds and to exhibit one's own contrasting humanitarianism. This 
of course is why there is official reluctance to receive refugees from friendly or allied states, 
however oppressive to certain of their citizens they may be .... 
Whelan, Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy, 44 U. P1rr. L. REV. 447, 479-80 (1983). 
180 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:152 
cerns, as well as other, less well-articulated considerations, formed the 
basis of the decision to deny EVD status to the Salvadorans. 154 The 
Employees Union court found that, because the Attorney General was 
exercising his discretion, his decision to shift the parameters of the 
class eligible for EVD status was one that necessarily was not subject 
to judicial review.155 
Although discretionary actions, particularly those taken by the im-
migration authorities, are subject to limited review, they are not en-
tirely precluded from judicial review. As has often been noted, 
"[d]iscretion does not mean license."156 Agency action which abuses 
the discretion granted to it by Congress is impermissible. In failing to 
examine the Attorney General's decision for abuse of discretion, the 
Employees Union court ignored the significant interest of the 
Salvadorans in ensuring that their status be determined fairly. 
V. REVIEWING EVD DETERMINATIONS UNDER THE APA 
The Employees Union court stated that the AP A precluded it from 
reviewing EVD determinations. Yet the provisions it cited do not nec-
essarily foreclose judicial scrutiny of the Attorney General's actions. 
First, the court claimed that since the protections of the deportation 
process were still available to aliens denied EVD, judicial review was 
unavailable because EVD was not a "final agency action."157 The 
AP A's requirement that final agency action be taken before judicial 
review is available "is designed to avoid premature judicial involve-
ment in the agency decision making process."158 In addition to satis-
fying the pragmatic concern of providing the court with a sufficient 
basis for judicial review, 159 the requirement also ensures the agency 
ample opportunity to exercise the decisionmaking authority the legis-
lature granted it. 
EVD does not present these jurisprudential concerns. If the Attor-
ney General denies certain aliens EVD status based on impermissible 
grounds, he has taken a final action for which there is no other ade-
quate remedy. 160 The use of inappropriate criteria in the EVD deter-
154. See note 153 supra. 
155. See note 76 supra and accompanying text. 
156. Sang Seup Shin v. INS, 750 F.2d 122, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see also Dworkin, The 
Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 14, 33 (1967) ("discretion is not tantamount to license"). 
Indeed, "[ w ]hile the extent of power possessed by one exercising discretion varies, in our legal 
system discretion usually means judgment 'guided by sound legal principles,' producing decisions 
made 'according to the rules of reason and justice, not according to private opinion . • . .' " 
Sofaer, supra note 112, at 1349 (footnote omitted). 
157. See notes 72 & 73 supra and accompanying text. 
158. R. PIERCE, JR., S. SHAPIRO & P. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 182 
(1985). 
159. Id. at 182-83. 
160. Cf 2 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 7.2d, at 7-31 (denials of voluntary 
departure or arbitrary restrictions on the privilege are subject to judicial review). 
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mination will deny the aliens access to a valuable status despite the 
availability of other types of individualized deportation relief. 161 
The Employees Union court also found that the AP A precluded 
judicial review of the Attorney General's decision to deny EVD to 
Salvadorans because EVD was an extrastatutory status and thus 
presented no standard for review. 162 In so holding, however, the court 
ignored the standard set by the Attorney General himself through his 
past grants of EVD. The court should have reviewed his determina-
tion to see if it departed from his past practices in such a way as to 
constitute an abuse of discretion. 
The AP A divides all administrative actions into three categories: 
quasi-judicial adjudication, quasi-legislative rulemaking, and a 
residual category - "informal action."163 While the APA outlines 
specific procedural rules and standards of judicial review for rulemak.-
ing and adjudication, 164 no such standards are provided for informal 
agency action. Thus, discretionary actions, which fall into this resid-
uum, are typically reviewed for "abuse of discretion" in accordance 
with the AP A's "catchall" provision.165 
161. The Employees Union court's preemptive dismissal of judicial review on this basis ig-
nores the very real advantages accruing to aliens from a favorable exercise of EVD discretion. 
First, aliens derive a substantial benefit from not having to undergo deportation proceedings, 
regardless of the various forms of relief that may be available in that process. Cf Verkuil, supra 
note 87, at 1153 n.61 ("[A] favorable discretionary action is a very valuable advantage, since it 
renders the deportation process unnecessary."). Second, and more important, aliens granted 
EVD receive a group status; each individual alien need not convince an immigration official to 
exercise his or her discretion in the alien's favor. Given the vagaries of the immigration relief 
processes, see Sofaer, supra note 112, at 1295 (finding that "inconsistency, arbitrariness and ... 
waste correlate with [INS] discretionary power"), the benefits of group relief should not be 
underestimated. 
162. See notes 81 & 82 supra and accompanying text. 
163. See Shapiro, supra note 128, at 1488. 
164. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553-557, 706(2)(E) (1982). 
165. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1982) provides in relevant part: "The reviewing court shall. .. (2) hold 
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be - (A) arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law .... " See generally 
Shapiro, supra note 128, at 1488-89. As Shapiro notes, it has become "commonplace" to point 
out that § 706 is in apparent conflict with § 701, which excepts "agency action ... committed to 
agency discretion by law" from judicial review. Id. at 1489 n.11. By subjecting all agency action 
to judicial review except where review is barred by statute or committed to agency discretion by 
Jaw, however, § 701 creates a "strong presumption" of reviewability. See also Dunlop v. 
Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567 (1975); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402, 410 (1971); Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967). The Supreme 
Court has stated that the "committed to agency discretion" exception is "very narrow," Overton 
Park, 401 U.S. at 410, and that "it is applicable in those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn 
in such broad terms that in a given case there is no Jaw to apply.'" 401 U.S. at 410 (quoting S. 
REP. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). See also Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 
(1970) ("judicial review of such administrative action is the rule, and nonreviewability an excep-
tion which must be demonstrated"); Local 1219, American Fedn. of Govt. Employees v. Dono-
van, 683 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (citations omitted): 
[T]he APA's exception for "agency action committed to agency discretion" shields from 
review only those matters for which "a fair appraisal of the legislative scheme, including a 
weighing of practical and policy implications of reviewability, persuasively indicates that 
judicial review should be circumscribed.'' Only when "the considerations in favor of 
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The judicial review provided for discretionary actions is extremely 
narrow. A court "can interfere only when there has been a clear abuse 
of discretion or a clear failure to exercise discretion."166 The courts 
reason that where Congress has entrusted an administrator or agency 
with discretionary authority, the judiciary will not substitute its judg-
ment for that of the administrator. 167 Nonetheless, a court can inter-
vene to correct actions it considers "manifestly illegal, unfair, or 
unjust." 168 
Although the AP A does not define "abuse of discretion," courts 
have developed standards for this type of judicial review. In Wong 
Wing Hang v. INS, 169 Judge Friendly defined abuse of discretion as an 
action "made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed 
from established policies, or rested on an impermissible basis such as 
an invidious discrimination against a particular race or group, or ... 
on other 'considerations that Congress could not have intended to 
make relevant.' " 170 The·courts have established that an agency must 
either follow its own precedents or explain why it departs from 
them: 171 "[A]n agency changing its course must supply a reasoned 
nonreviewability ... are sufficiently compelling to rebut the strong presumption of judicial 
review" will we conclude that judicial review is foreclosed. 
Thus, "[c]ourts have continuously narrowed the category of actions considered to be so discre-
tionary as to be exempted from review." Shapiro, supra note 128, at 1489 n.11. 
166. United States ex rel Adel v. Shaughnessy, 183 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir. 1950) (footnotes 
omitted); see also Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 228 (1963); MacKay v. McAlexander, 268 F.2d 35, 
40 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 961 (1960). 
167. See, e.g., Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 
U.S. 405 (1960) (per curiam); Goon Wing Wah v. INS, 386 F.2d 292, 294 (1st Cir. 1967); Chen 
v. Foley, 385 F.2d 929, 934 (6th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 838 (1968); Kam Ng v. Pilliod, 
279 F.2d 207, 210 (7th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 860 (1961); United States ex rel. Cianna· 
mea v. Neelly, 202 F.2d 289, 292 (7th Cir. 1953). 
168. 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 8.14, at 8-123. 
169. 360 F.2d 715 (2d Cir. 1966). 
170. 360 F.2d at 719 (quoting United States ex rel Kaloudis v. Shaughnessy, 180 F.2d 489, 
491 (2d Cir. 1950)); see also Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 212 (2d Cir. 1982) (standard 
adopted in challenge of denial of parole to Haitians); Conceiro v. Marks, 360 F. Supp. 454, 457 
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (standard applied to district director's denial of parole to an excludable political 
asylum applicant). Other courts have articulated similar standards in other immigration cases. 
See, e.g., Osuchukwu v. INS, 744 F.2d 1136, 1142 (5th Cir. 1984): 
It is our duty to allow decision [sic] to be made by the Attorney General's delegate, even a 
decision that we deem in error, so long as it is not capricious, racially invidious, utterly 
without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so aberrational that it is arbitrary rather 
than the result of any perceptible rational approach. 
See also Sang Seup Shin v. INS, 750 F.2d 122, 125, 127 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (citations and footnote 
omitted): 
Broad as the [Bureau oflmmigration Appeals'] discretion is, however, that tribunal may not 
act arbitrarily or irrationally. It may not proceed at whim, shedding its grace unevenly from 
case to case. It must explain departures from settled policies ... and it may not unaccounta-
bly disregard on one day considerations it held relevant on another day. • • . What deter-
mines rights in one case the Board may not ignore in the next. Discretion does not mean 
license. 
171. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973) 
(ICC departures from settled precedent regarding rate increases) (emphasis added): 
The agency may flatly repudiate [prior] norms, deciding, for example, that changed circum-
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analysis indicating that prior policies and standards are being deliber-
ately changed, not casually ignored, and if an agency glosses over or 
swerves from prior precedents without discussion it may cross the line 
from the tolerably terse to the intolerably mute."172 Thus, actions by 
the Attorney General that violate standards of fairness and rationality 
abuse the discretion granted him by Congress. 
The Employees Union court, therefore, should have reviewed the 
Attorney General's decision to see (1) whether the determination to 
deny EVD status to Salvadoran nationals represented a change in pol-
icy, and (2) if the Attorney General did alter his policy, whether his 
alteration had a rational explanation. The court never got to the first 
inquiry, however. Although the Attorney General had always es-
poused humanitarian concerns when granting EVD in the past,173 the 
Employees Union court declined to find that these prior practices had 
established a "humanitarian" standard, fearing that such a standard 
would "open up irresponsibly the floodgates to illegal aliens" in disre-
gard of immigration and foreign policy considerations.114 
The Employees Union court's fear that a humanitarian standard 
would deprive the Attorney General of the ability to make necessary 
distinctions in the immigration area is unfounded. The court errone-
ously assumed that finding a humanitarian standard in past grants of 
EVD would mandate the granting of the status to all future aliens who 
fell within this category. But, as described earlier, most forms of dis-
cretionary immigration relief involve a two-step process. 175 The immi-
gration official must first determine whether the alien meets the 
statutory or administrative requirements for relief. Only if the answer 
stances mean that they are no longer required in order to effectuate congressional policy. Or 
it may narrow the zone in which some rule will be applied, because it appears that a more 
discriminating invocation of the rule will best serve congressional policy. Or it may find 
that, although the rule in general serves useful purposes, peculiarities of the case before it 
suggests that the rule not be applied in that case. Whatever the ground for the departure 
from prior norms, however, it must be clearly set forth so that the reviewing court may under-
stand the basis of the agency's action and so may judge the consistency of that action with the 
agency's mandate. 
172. Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 852 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. 
denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971) (footnotes omitted). This view has been consistently adopted by the 
courts. See, e.g., Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 808 (1973) 
(agency has a "duty to explain its departure from prior norms"); Greyhound Corp. v. ICC, 551 
F.2d 414, 416 (D.C. Cir. 1977) ("This court emphatically requires that administrative agencies 
adhere to their own precedents or explain any deviations from them."); Contractors Transp. 
Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 1160, 1162 (4th Cir. 1976); Frozen Food Express, Inc. v. United 
States, 535 F.2d 877, 880 (5th Cir. 1976); Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. FCC, 454 F.2d 1018, 
1027 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agency "duty bound to justify" facially conflicting decisions). 
173. See note 152 supra. It is possible, of course, that humanitarian concerns were not the 
true motivation for the Attorney General's earlier grants of EVD. Nonetheless, he should be 
held to his own stated reasons and should not be allowed to offer post-hoc rationalizations for his 
actions. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 567 F.2d 96, 100 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 419 (1971). 
174. 594 F. Supp. at 508; see note 82 supra and accompanying text. 
175. See notes 140 & 141 supra and accompanying text. 
184 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:152 
is in the affirmative does the official go on to decide whether he or she 
will exercise his or her discretion favorably. 176 
Thus, making the Attorney General exercise his discretion in con-
formance with his past practices does not necessarily provide auto-
matic entrance into the United States for all aliens whose countries are 
undergoing some sort of turmoil. The standard does not create an 
entitlement to the status; rather, it ensures that similarly situated 
aliens will have their eligibility for the status evaluated according to 
the same criteria. Moreover, reviewing the Attorney General's deci-
sion for abuse of discretion in this way would not create an inexorable 
eligibility standard which would shackle his discretion and eliminate 
the flexibility he needs to deal with unanticipated situations. Depar-
tures from existing precedents are permissible when they are accompa-
nied by a rational explanation.177 If factors necessitate a change in 
policy, the Attorney General can easily accommodate them. 
Subjecting the Attorney General's decision to deny EVD to Salva-
doran nationals to judicial review runs counter to the teachings of 
classical immigration law. However, if we look at the competing inter-
ests at stake, we see that the scales lean heavily toward affording the 
aliens some administrative process.178 The aliens involved here have 
an interest in receiving accurate, nonarbitrary decisionmaking. 
Although the relief they seek is discretionary and they have no abso-
lute right to that relief, these aliens deserve to receive a procedure 
equivalent to that afforded other similarly situated aliens. 179 
Of course, the aliens' interest in receiving consistent, fair determi-
nations competes with that of the government in adopting procedures 
which ensure fiscal and administrative efficiency,180 speed, and accu-
176. See generally 2 c. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, supra note 1, § 7.l(b)(3), at 7-9 to 7-13. 
177. See, e.g., Marine Space Enclosures, Inc. v. Federal Maritime Commn., 420 F.2d 577, 
585 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnote omitted): 
An agency may modify or even reverse its past policies and announcements, but the 
confidence of a reviewing court that these adjustments are made in accordance with the 
requirements of law is not enhanced when the prior precedents are not discussed, the 
swerves and reversals are not identified, and the entire matter is brushed off once over 
lightly. 
178. Cf. Verkuil, supra note 87, at 1152-53 & n.61. This Note does not argue that aliens 
denied EVD should be allowed to assert due process or equal protection claims. As a discretion-
ary relief for extraordinary situations, EVD does not warrant such constitutional protection. 
See, e.g., id. at 1178-79. Schuck, in fact, criticized the first Employees Union opinion on precisely 
this ground, noting that "[t]o surround [EVD] with constitutional constraints not applicable to 
excludable aliens generally could reduce and perhaps even eliminate its usefulness to the govern-
ment and to aliens." Schuck, supra note 87, at 60. But, as Verkuil points out, discretionary 
decisions, such as EVD, do demand "some check on the regularity of agency behavior." Verkuil, 
supra note 87, at 1179. This need can be accommodated through (1) "the use of standards and 
rules to guide agency deciders," and (2) limited judicial and adminstrative review. Verkuil, supra 
note 87, at 1179 n.233. 
179. See Verkuil, supra note 87, at 1152-53 & n.61. 
180. Id. at 1149. 
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racy. 181 Because of these governmental interests, the courts are hesi-
tant to require any agency, including the INS, to create standards or 
to make rules. 182 Yet EVD graphically illustrates the dangers inherent 
in such a deferential approach. The Attorney General has never ar-
ticulated standards for grants of EVD; indeed, he has never formalized 
the status in any way. Allowing the Attorney General to exercise un-
fettered discretion in this area simply because he chooses not to cir-
cumscribe his discretion creates a reductio ad absurdum: the Attorney 
General has unlimited discretion because he has stated that he has 
unlimited discretion. If there are no standards, formal or otherwise, 
guiding his discretion and no judicial review is available, the Attorney 
General in effect has unchecked power to allow any groups of aliens he 
selects to stay in the United States for indeterminate periods. The po-
tential for abuse - through discriminatory decisions or decisions 
based on factors not contemplated by Congress when it drafted the 
INA - is great. 
The INS has long been criticized for its deficiency in articulating 
standards to constrain and guide its discretion.183 Although not all 
types of administrative discretion need to be checked,184 EVD is pre-
cisely the type of status that requires such limitations. Unless the At-
torney General sets standards for the granting of EVD status, the 
public has no means of evaluating his decisions or of determining 
whether he is acting in a discriminatory manner. The result is a deci-
sion that is not perceived as fair or legitimate, either by the public or 
by the aliens involved. 
Making the Attorney General publicly articulate the reasons for 
his modification or exception would provide legitimacy for that deci-
sion. First, a "reasons requirement" would force the Attorney Gen-
eral to consider his decision more carefully, and force him to confront 
his own motives for modifying the standards for relief. 185 Second, it 
would increase his sense of accountability by forcing him to bear the 
full political costs of his decision. Such a requirement would place a 
burden on the Attorney General only where his policy change is based 
on impermissible grounds.186 
181. Id. at 1164. 
182. Id. at 1178. 
183. See, e.g., Ameeriar v. INS, 438 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 801 (1971); 
Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65, 92-97 (1983); Roberts, 
supra note 117, at 158 & n.60; Sofaer, supra note 112, at 1313. 
184. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 112, at 1295-97 (constraints on discretion not required 
where consequences of discretion are unimportant, other controls are present or standards can-
not be effectively articulated). 
185. See Rabin, Job Security and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through 
a Reasons Requirement, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 60, 78 (1976). 
186. See Note, Violations By Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 HARV. L. REV. 629, 649 
(1974). . 
186 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 85:152 
Requiring the Attorney General to state his reasons for departing 
from his standard would also yield important safeguards for the aliens 
involved. First, it would provide a basis for judicial review to ensure 
that the departure was not an abuse of discretion. 187 Second, an open 
record of past criteria would help ensure that similarly situated aliens 
would be able to obtain equivalent treatment in the future.188 
Aliens, like all other participants in our society, have a fundamen-
tal interest in being free from arbitrary governmental action.189 When 
standards are not present, the affected aliens have no idea what type of 
proof they should marshal to support their requests for relief, 190 nor 
do they have any way of gauging whether their applications were 
treated fairly. The end result is increased costs, both for the eligible 
aliens, who may have been discriminated against, and for the INS, 
which faces potentially stricter judicial scrutiny as a result of its lack 
of standards. 191 
VI. COMMUNITARIANISM REVISITED 
How, then, is judicial review of EVD decisions consistent with the 
current infusion of communitarian standards in immigration law? As 
noted earlier, 192 immigration law presents an opportunity for "admin-
istrative abuse and lawlessness" unparalleled in other areas of public 
law.193 The Employees Union court's decision that EVD is an unre-
viewable exercise of prosecutorial discretion illustrates the potential 
dangers caused by unwarranted judicial deference. In effect, the court 
said that the Attorney General was free to create a form of deportation 
relief not sanctioned by the INA and that he could, by virtue of his 
own refusal to articulate standards or other criteria, grant or deny that 
status unhindered by any legal constraints. 
187. See id. at 642. 
188. See id. 
189. Cf. K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 43 (1951) 
('~ustice demands ... that like men be treated alike in like conditions"); Ludd, Balanced Under· 
standing, supra note 88, at 22; Developments, supra note 90, at 1297-98. 
190. See Roberts, supra note 117, at 152. 
191. See Verkuil, supra note 87, at 1205. 
192. See note 88 supra and accompanying text. 
193. Schuck, supra note 87, at 81-82: 
Few areas of public law are so susceptible to administrative abuse and lawlessness as immi-
gration Jaw. The INS is among the most insular and chronically understaffed of federal 
agencies; it is vulnerable to manipulation and neglect by Congress and to political reprisals 
by powerful employer interests opposed to vigorous law enforcement. Aliens, the nominal 
clients of the system, are politically and economically weak, unfamiliar with legal forms, 
procedures, and the language, and often reluctant or unable to assert their rights. • • • 
[A]liens often exist in a kind of social vacuum, outside any structures of institutional, 
programmatic, administrative, or professional support. 
INS decisions, moreover, have low visibility; they occur in isolated adjudicatory contexts 
in which their larger policy consequences, if any, are fragmented and thus difficult to discern 
or monitor. 
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Such unbridled discretion may be countenanced by those embrac-
ing the traditional restrictive view of immigration law. But in view of 
the essential life and liberty interests at stake in EVD decisions, any-
one who admits the fundamental humanity of aliens must be offended 
by the notion that the Attorney General has boundless discretion to 
bestow such an important status in any manner he wishes. 
Increased judicial assertiveness in this area is necessary to preserve 
the integrity of immigration law. The solution is not to surround 
EVD with inflexible constitutional requirements. 194 Rather, the 
courts should require the Attorney General to state clearly his criteria 
for determining EVD eligibility and should demand rational explana-
tions for any deviations from the stated policy.195 Determinations as 
to which aliens will receive EVD status must ultimately rest with the 
Attorney General. The courts nonetheless should play an active role 
in ensuring that the procedures by which those determinations are 
made are perceived as accurate, fair, and legitimate, both by the aliens 
affected and by the public as a whole. 
CONCLUSION 
Requiring the Attorney General to apply an administratively fair 
procedure to his EVD eligibility determinations will enhance the per-
ceived legitimacy of his actions and will force him to bear the full 
public costs of his actions - both undeniably important interests. In 
the end, however, aliens such as the Salvadorans will gain little practi-
cal benefit from such a requirement. The Attorney General will still 
have the discretionary power to deny them the relief they seek even 
though they qualify for the status - he will just have to do it in a 
procedurally fair way. 
Many have urged that Congress enact special legislation granting 
EVD status to Salvadorans.19 6 While such a suggestion would solve 
the dilemma that these particular aliens currently face, it would do 
nothing for future aliens who find themselves in a similar situation. 
Rather, comprehensive new legislation is needed to combat the 
problems now associated with EVD. 
First, EVD should be renamed to alleviate the confusion now asso-
ciated with the name. 197 "Temporary safe haven" has been suggested 
194. See note 178 supra. 
195. See Schuck, supra note 87, at 84 (footnote omitted): 
Where life and liberty interests collide with powerful foreign policy, law enforcement, or 
other governmental interests, courts should seek relatively flexible solutions, such as "clear 
statement" requirements or remands to the agency with instructions to develop new ap-
proaches, rather than finding refuge in rigid constitutional rulings. 
196. See, e.g., Note, supra note 5, at 331-33. 
197. See notes 16 & 17 supra and accompanying text. INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra 
note 1, at 69, also made this point: 
"Extended voluntary departure sounds like jargon," said one individual. "Ifwe have a pro-
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by many, since this term "highlight[s] the temporary nature of the 
program and its humanitarian intent."198 More than just cosmetic 
changes are needed, however. Congress should specifically grant the 
Attorney General the power to grant this status, thus removing any 
doubts as to either the legitimacy or the source of his authority. 199 
The humanitarian objective of the status should be made clear, and 
perhaps its scope should be broadened to include aliens whose coun-
tries are experiencing natural catastrophes, not just political up-
heaval. 200 It would be undesirable and impractical to set concrete 
legislative standards for determining when EVD status should be 
granted. The United States cannot possibly grant relief to nationals 
from every country undergoing civil unrest. Congress can, however, 
by articulating guidelines and by requiring the Attorney General to 
issue findings along with his determination, curtail the likelihood of 
EVD being reduced to a mere foreign policy tool in the hands of the 
executive branch. Finally, the procedures governing grants of EVD 
should be standardized. A cut-off date should be assigned to each 
grant to deter further illegal emigration from that country,201 and INS 
gram where we grant people temporary safe refuge or safe haven for limited periods of time, 
why not call it that. Safe haven or temporary refuge is something people can understand." 
198. INS, Asylum Adjudications, supra note 1, at 72. The INS suggested using either the 
term "temporary refuge" or "safe haven,'' but noted that "[t]he term temporary refugee is also 
used by the State Department for those foreign nationals given refuge in U.S. embassies and 
consulates overseas." Id. "Safe haven" has been proposed by others as well. See, e.g., Refugee 
Assistance: Hearings on H.R. 3195 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and Interna-
tional Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 103 (1983) [hereinafter Refugee 
Assistance] (statement of T.A. Aleinikoft). 
199. As Professor Aleinikoff has noted, congressional establishment of EVD 
would allow the United States to extend temporary protection to persons of humanitarian 
concern without either distorting the definition of "refugee" in our laws or increasing the 
number of aliens who seek permanent residence here. It would provide a statutory basis for 
administrative practices that have developed without careful thought or congressional over-
sight. It would foster public debate on issues that have previously been handled out of the 
public eye. 
Refugee Assistance, supra note 198, at 103. 
200. Although EVD has never been defined as applying to nationals of countries suffering 
from natural disasters, this appears to be a logical extension of EVD's scope. At one time, 
United States immigration law provided for "conditional entry" of aliens who had "been forced 
to flee their homes as a result of serious natural disasters, such as earthquakes, volcanic erup· 
tions, tidal waves, and in any similar natural catastrophes." S. REP. No. 748, 89th Cong., 1st 
Sess. 16, reprinted in 1965 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3328, 3335; see Act of Oct. 3, 
1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 203(a)(7)(B), 79 STAT. 911, 913 (1965). Aliens were never able to 
use this provision because of the regulatory and statutory barriers erected. See Note, Victims of 
Natural Disasters in U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, 1982 MICH. Y.B. INTL. LEGAL STUD. 137, 
140. The provision was repealed by the Refugee Act of 1980, § 203(c)(3), leaving the victims of 
natural disasters without relief under U.S. Jaw. One commentator has suggested that such aliens 
should be granted refugee status: "[W]hen the disaster constitutes a continuing threat to human 
life, and aid to the stricken area cannot restore an acceptable standard of living, then the distinc· 
tion between natural disaster victims and refugees fearing persecution becomes arbitrary and 
inhumane." Note, supra, at 137-38. A better solution would be to permit these aliens to enter 
the United States under a grant of EVD, thus enabling the U.S. government to require them to 
leave when conditions in the home country have stabilized. 
201. This was one of the major concerns espoused by the Attorney General and the Secretary 
October 1986] Note - Extended Voluntary Departure 189 
officials should be well-informed as to the Attorney General's 
decisions. 202 
EVD will always carry political overtones simply because it is im-
possible for the United States to grant EVD status to all of the multi-
tude of aliens whose countries are experiencing political or other 
internal disruptions. But even though the United States cannot grant 
relief to all, it can ensure that its decisions are fair and evenhanded. 
Only open acknowledgement of the standards for this relief can pre-
serve its integrity, for "[s]ecret law ... has no place in any decent 
system of justice. "203 
AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT 
As this Note was going to press, the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit handed down its decision in the Employees 
Union appeal. 204 The appellate court, like the lower court, applied the 
traditional view of immigration law, finding that "EVD is an extra-
statutory remedy and that the decision to award or to withhold it for 
citizens of a particular nation lies squarely within the discretion of the 
Attorney General."205 The court of appeals agreed with the district 
court that the AP A precluded judicial review of EVD determinations, 
noting that such determinations were neither made reviewable by stat-
ute nor were final agency actions for which there was no other ade-
quate judicial remedy.206 The appellate court also declined to find that 
EVD grants were controlled by a "humanitarian" standard, fearing 
that imposition of such a standard would "impermissibly curtail" the 
exercise of the Attorney General's discretion. 207 Although the court 
of State in connection with the Salvadoran petition for EVD. See, e.g., Letter from William F. 
Smith, Attorney General, to George P. Shultz, Secretary of State (June 23, 1983), reprinted in 
Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 6, at Exhibit C ("[B]ased on past experience, the Depart-
ment has concluded that a grant of EVD is, if not a magnet, at least an inducement to members 
of the beneficiary nationality to seek to enter the United States by any means, since they can 
avoid deportation."); Letter from William F. Smith, Attorney General, to Representative Law-
rence S. Smith (July 19,1983), reprinted in Defendants' Memorandum, supra note 6, at Exhibit D 
("[T]here are hundreds of thousands of illegal Salvadoran aliens already in the United States. 
This is but one facet of the current crisis in which our country is experiencing a floodtide of 
illegal immigrants. A grant of 'extended voluntary departure' to the Salvadorans undoubtedly 
would encourage the migration of many more such aliens."). 
202. See note 16 supra. 
203. K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 110 (1969). 
204. Hotel & Restaurant Employees Union, Local 25 v. Attorney General, 804 F.2d 1256 
(D.C. Cir. 1986). 
205. 804 F.2d at 1272. Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment to the defendants on the EVD issue, it reversed the district court's grant of 
summary judgment on the asylum issue. The appellate court found that the district court should 
have stayed the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the asylum issue, pending comple-
tion of discovery on the procedures used to process asylum claims. The court remanded the 
asylum issue to the district court. 804 F.2d at 1270. 
206. 804 F.2d at 1271. 
207. 804 F.2d at 1271. 
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acknowledged that "an agency may not arbitrarily grant or withhold 
statutorily created and defined remedies,"208 it found that "[a]n 
agency's exercise of inherent, extra-statutory discretion . . . is quite 
another matter."209 Thus, the court of appeals, like the district court, 
refused to limit the Attorney General's discretion, or even to require 
him to articulate his standards for granting EVD status. 
- Lynda J. Oswald 
208. 804 F.2d at 1271 (citations omitted). 
209. 804 F.2d at 1271. The court did contemplate a narrow standard of review for EVD 
decisions. The majority opinion rejected Judge Silberman's concurring argument that EVD is 
nonreviewable under the APA because EVD is "committed to agency discretion by law" within 
the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). Instead, the majority stated: 
We agree that there is no meaningful standard in this case, but decline to insulate all deci-
sions concerning EVD from review on the far-reaching theory that they are "committed to 
agency discretion by law." That position would effectively insulate all EVD decisions, even 
ones that may be animated by illegal discriminatory animus, from review. Instead, ••• 
decisions made by the Congress or the President in the area of immigration are subject to a 
narrow standard of review. 
804 F.2d at 1272 (citing Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 796 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 
81-82 (1976)). It appears that the court might limit this review to determinations which are not 
facially legitimate. See 804 F.2d at 1271-72 ("Where Congress has not seen fit to limit the 
agency's discretion to suspend enforcement of a statute as to particular groups of aliens, we 
cannot review facially legitimate exercises of that discretion."). 
